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INTRODUCTION
In arguing that President Washington could not interpret a
mutual defense treaty that potentially required America to join
battle with France—but that only Congress could interpret the
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treaty on account of its power to declare war—James Madison
reasoned as follows:
[T]he same specific function or act, cannot possibly belong to the two
departments and be separately exerciseable by each.
....
A concurrent authority in two independent departments to perform the same function with respect to the same thing, would be as
awkward in practice, as it is unnatural in theory.1

Madison’s approach has broad implications beyond the specific
question he was examining. Because the Constitution spends
most of its time allocating power to specific institutions, the
question of whether constitutionally allocated power is exclusively held by a single institution (as Madison believed), or instead can be concurrently held by two, is pervasive.
Probably nowhere else has Madison’s view of the basic architecture of American constitutionalism proven to be so wrong.
This Article shows that concurrence—what Madison believed to
be “awkward in practice . . . [and] unnatural in theory”2—is today widespread. In doing so, the Article uncovers an integral,
yet largely overlooked, feature of constitutional law.
As regards separation of powers, for example, though the
Constitution gives the President the “Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons,”3 Congress can grant amnesties that, according to
the Supreme Court, are functionally equivalent to pardons.4
Similarly, while the Constitution specifies only one mechanism
(treaty) through which the federal government can create international agreements,5 many contemporary international obligations have been created by congressional-executive agreements, which do not require a supermajority of senators.6
With regard to “vertical” federalism, though Congress has
the power to regulate interstate commerce, states also have
power to regulate interstate commerce.7 With respect to “hori1. JAMES MADISON, HELVIDIUS NUMBER II (1793), reprinted in ALEXANHAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF
1793–1794: TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 68–69
(Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007).
2. Id. at 69.
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
4. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896) (recognizing this and noting that the difference between pardons and amnesties is “one rather of philological interest than of legal importance” (quoting Knote v. United States, 95
U.S. 149, 153 (1877))).
5. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
DER
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zontal” federalism, multiple states frequently have power to regulate a given person, transaction, or occurrence.8
Concurrent power is found in other contexts beyond separation of powers and federalism. For example, though the Seventh Amendment allocates adjudicatory fact-finding power to
the jury, institutions apart from juries also find facts: administrative law judges in Article I courts find facts in the very same
contests where juries would have the constitutional power to
fact-find, and Article III judges engage in fact-finding of the
sort performed by juries when they decide motions for summary judgment and motions to grant judgment as a matter of
law. To provide one last example, although the power to sue
government contractors belongs to the executive branch, it does
not rest exclusively there: qui tam statutes empower private
citizens to sue, on behalf of the United States, anyone who has
submitted a false claim to the federal government.9 The power
to sue government contractors to recover for false claims accordingly rests with both the federal executive and private citizens.10
Though commentators focusing on discrete doctrines sometimes have recognized that governmental powers can overlap,11
this Article is the first to comprehensively analyze the phenomenon of concurrence. Examining multiple doctrinal contexts,
this Article uncovers patterns that can lead to a more informed
choice between exclusivity and concurrence in the future. This
is important because many contested contemporary issues implicate the choice between exclusivity and concurrence. For example, though the Constitution specifically vests the power to
declare war with Congress, does the President also have a simi-

8. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981); Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, and Institutional Considerations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 729–30
(2007).
9. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006).
10. See id. Likewise, the posse comitatus doctrine allowed state and federal executive officials to compel private citizens to assist in the making of arrests and in otherwise executing a wide range of state and federal laws, exemplifying yet another instance of concurrence: executive power that is jointly
exercised by the executive branch and private sector. See infra note 337.
11. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 (2000)
(“[N]early every federal statute addresses an area in which the states also
have authority to legislate . . . .”); Lee H. Rosenthal, Back in the Court’s Court,
74 UMKC L. REV. 687, 695–96 (2006) (noting that problems arising from asbestos can be handled either by legislatures or courts).
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lar power?12 Or, are there mechanisms outside of Article V by
which the Constitution can, in effect, be amended?13
This Article is composed of six parts. Part I formally defines concurrence and exclusivity, and then identifies seven
contemporary instances of concurrence. Part I also explains
concurrence’s relation to the familiar concepts of checks and
balances, enumerated powers, and expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Part I concludes by closely analyzing James Madison’s
argument for exclusivity that appears in his famed Helvidius
Number II, as well as Alexander Hamilton’s response in support of concurrence.14
This Article’s next four parts identify and analyze recurring patterns that emerge across multiple doctrines in American constitutional law. Part II uncovers a stunning historical
pattern: virtually all places where power today is held concurrently amount to reversals of the Court’s original view that the
power in question was held exclusively by only one institution.
Part II documents the doctrinal process by which the Supreme
Court came to accept concurrence in several arenas. In so
doing, the Supreme Court rejected categorical application of the
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means
“to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the
other, or of the alternative.”15 Part II also shows, however, that
concurrence has not eclipsed exclusivity. Many of the Constitution’s power allocations are, and always have been, understood
as vesting power in solely one institution, and there is at least
one instance of a countertrajectory where the Court stepped
back somewhat from concurrence and headed back towards exclusivity.16

12. See Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential Declarations of War, 37 U.C. DA321, 324 (2003) (concluding that the President can declare wars).
13. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 44 –47
(1991) (arguing that the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted by mechanisms outside of Article V); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (2006) (“[O]fficials responsible for interpreting the
Constitution might respond to the shifts in popular opinion that a campaign to
amend the Constitution produced, even if, by formal measures, the People endorsed the status quo.”).
14. For an informative overview of the Madison-Hamilton exclusivity debates, see H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS 47–51 (2002).
15. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009).
16. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
VIS L. REV.

1056

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[94:1051

Part III explores how and why there has been a switch
from exclusivity to concurrence. Part III first uncovers three recurring mechanisms by which concurrence is generated. It then
shows that, because courts tend to start with exclusivist assumptions, concurrence typically was initiated by nonjudicial
institutions, and gained judicial approval only after becoming
entrenched. An array of pragmatic considerations fueled the
shift from exclusivity to concurrence: concurrence has been
turned to when the most obviously tasked institution has failed
to act, to conscript another institution’s complementary competencies and thereby improve governmental activity, to achieve
administrative efficiencies, to solve problems unanticipated by
the Founders, and to meet emergencies.17
Part IV points out that the choice between exclusivity and
concurrence is not “all or nothing.” Much power is still exclusively held by a single institution. Moreover, even where there
is concurrence, there typically are limits on the degree to which
power can be shared among two or more institutions. Taken as
a whole, Part IV suggests that the choice between exclusivity
and concurrence has been made not on the basis of transsubstantive or categorical principles, but on context-specific determinations. This suggests that slippery slope concerns articulated by some scholars—that permitting concurrence in one
context could lead to the disappearance of exclusivity and concomitant chaos—are overblown.18
Part V addresses one of concurrence’s crucial downsides:
the chance of conflict between institutions with overlapping
powers. But this is not a reason to categorically reject concurrence. Part V shows that American law has developed many
methods for dealing with interinstitutional conflict. Accordingly, while the possibility of conflict is a veritable cost to be
weighed against concurrence’s potential benefits, it is not a basis for rejecting concurrence as an a priori matter.
Part VI draws lessons from this Article’s findings. After
considering four different “metanarratives” that help explain
the shift from exclusivity to concurrence, Part VI considers the
constitutional implications of its findings. Context-specific considerations have guided the choice between exclusivity and con17. See infra Part III.B.
18. For an example of such a concern in a context relevant to concurrence,
see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot,
93 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1053 (2007) (arguing that delegation by the President abridges the power of the executive branch).
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currence. This Article defends this practice, explaining why
concurrence is not per se unconstitutional under expressio unius est exclusio alterius and why it is not inconsistent with the
concept of enumerated powers. Concurrence has been embraced
from the start of our nation, and the Constitution’s text almost
never forecloses it. The choice between exclusivity and concurrence is appropriately made on a context-by-context basis,
though experience from other contexts may be illuminating.
I. THE ANALYTICS OF CONCURRENCE, AND SOME
EXAMPLES
After defining concurrence and exclusivity, this Part surveys seven contemporary examples of concurrence, introduces
several analytical tools that deepen an understanding of concurrence, and analyzes Hamilton’s and Madison’s debates concerning the choice between exclusivity and concurrence—the
earliest and most exhaustive discussion of the subject to date.
A. DEFINITIONS
“Concurrence” refers to the arrangement where a given activity, X, can be performed by more than one institution, despite the fact that the Constitution appears to place the power
to do X in one specified institution. “Exclusivity” refers to the
situation where a given activity, X, can be performed by only a
single institution. By “institution,” I include the different entities that are explicitly referenced in the Constitution (for example, Congress, the Supreme Court, other Article III courts,
the President, states, juries, and the people), as well as novel
entities not mentioned in the Constitution, such as administrative agencies and supranational tribunals.
B. CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES
What follows—by way of description, not justification—are
seven contemporary examples of concurrence.
1. The Constitution states that “[i]n all Cases affecting
Ambassadors . . . and those in which a State shall be Party, the
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”19 Though the
Supreme Court indeed has original jurisdiction in these cases,
inferior district courts also have original jurisdiction over cases
brought by ambassadors and, in many cases, also over cases

19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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brought by states.20 Accordingly, notwithstanding the Constitution’s allocation of original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and in which states are a party to the Supreme Court,
district courts have concurrent authority to exercise original jurisdiction over such cases.
2. Article III of the Constitution states that “[t]he judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”21 Today, however, a significant amount of adjudication concerning federal matters occurs
in non-Article III federal courts.22 For example, contract and
property claims against the United States are heard in the nonArticle III United States Court of Federal Claims,23 and administrative agencies can hear disputes between private parties as
to the compensation owed to an injured maritime worker.24
These non-Article III institutions can oversee these adjudications despite the fact that both the above-mentioned claims also
could have been heard in Article III courts; contract and property claims against the United States also fall within federal
district courts’ jurisdiction, and federal district courts have
“long handled maritime personal injury claims.”25 Indeed, “at
least in some circumstances, virtually all of the kinds of cases
that are heard in Article III courts, including criminal cases
and civil disputes arising under the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the Unites States,” can be heard in non-Article III
federal courts.26 Accordingly, notwithstanding the Constitu20. See Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 469–72 (1884); see also infra Part
II.A (analyzing Ames in detail).
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
22. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN
THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 36–51 (1980); James E. Pfander, Article
I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States,
118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646 (2004) (“Congress has often assigned disputes that
appear to fall within the scope of the federal judicial power to Article I tribunals whose judges lack salary and tenure protections.”).
23. Pfander, supra note 22, at 657.
24. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932).
25. Pfander, supra note 22, at 657 n.52, 659.
26. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies,
and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 923 (1988). Consider, as well, the various supranational adjudicatory panels created under federal law. For example,
whereas the conclusions of the federal agencies tasked with administering the
United States antidumping laws typically are subject to judicial review by Article III courts, the North American Free Trade Implementation Act creates
new adjudicatory entities that are staffed by representatives of the two disputing countries. For a discussion of this issue, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Article
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tion’s allocation of the judicial power to Article III courts, nonArticle III courts frequently have concurrent authority to adjudicate disputes.
3. The Constitution states that “[t]he President . . . shall
have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses
against the United States.”27 The Supreme Court has held that
this provision does not “take from Congress the power to pass
acts of general amnesty,”28 notwithstanding the fact that “[t]he
distinction between amnesty and pardon is of no practical importance”29 and “is one rather of philological interest than of legal importance.”30 Accordingly, notwithstanding the Constitution’s allocation of the pardon power solely to the President,
Congress has concurrent authority to undertake acts that have
the functionally identical effect of legally forgiving past illegalities.
4. The Constitution specifies only one mechanism by which
the United States can create international agreements—the
treaty—concerning which it states that the “[President] shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.”31 Many of the most important international agreements that the United States entered into during the twentieth
century, however, are not treaties, but, instead, are congressional-executive agreements, which are negotiated by the President and approved by simple majorities of both houses of Congress.32 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law

III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 835–39
(2007). These adjudicatory entities are not Article III courts, yet they have the
power to “directly apply domestic American legal standards” and “issue orders
directly binding federal administrative officials without a right of appeal to
federal courts.” Id. at 837.
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
28. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896).
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877)).
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 303(2) (1986). International agreements also have been
created by the so-called sole executive agreements, which are negotiated by
the President and subject to no congressional approval whatsoever. See id.
§ 303(4). For example, President Carter’s sole executive agreement, known as
the “Algiers Accords,” gained release of the U.S. diplomatic personnel who
were taken hostage in 1979 in Iran. Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1608 (2007). Similarly, President
Clinton negotiated an agreement with German Chancellor Schroder establish-
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of the United States takes the position that “any agreement
concluded as a Congressional-Executive agreement could also
be concluded by treaty” and notes that “[t]he prevailing view is
that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an
alternative to the treaty method in every instance.”33 A prominent example of the congressional-executive agreement is the
North American Free Trade Agreement, which received sixtyone supporting votes and thirty-eight “noes” in the Senate34—
short of the two-thirds of senators present necessary for a treaty.35 The agreement bringing the United States into the World
Trade Organization was also a congressional-executive agreement, not a treaty.36 Accordingly, notwithstanding the Constitution’s specification of the treaty as the sole mechanism for
creating international obligations, the President has concurrent
authority with the Senate to create international obligations by
means of congressional-executive agreements.
5. The Constitution states that “[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States.”37 Most legal scholars who have examined the issue
agree that many administrative agencies have virtually unfettered discretion to generate regulations that are functionally
indistinguishable from statutes.38 For example, the Supreme
Court has upheld statutes that instruct agencies to regulate on
the basis of “public interest, convenience, or necessity,”39 to set
“fair and equitable prices,”40 or to set ambient air quality standards that are “requisite to protect the public health.”41 Accordingly, notwithstanding the Constitution’s allocation of “[a]ll
legislative Powers herein granted” to Congress, administrative
agencies have concurrent authority to create the rules that govern behavior.

ing a mechanism for handling insurance claims held by Holocaust victims. See
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 406–08 (2003).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e.
34. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 799, 801 (1995).
35. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
36. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 917–19.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
38. See infra Part II.D.
39. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943).
40. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427 (1944).
41. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 469 (2001).
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6. The Constitution states that “Congress shall have Power
To . . . regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”42 The
United States Supreme Court has held, however, that states
also have the power to regulate interstate commerce.43 Accordingly, notwithstanding the Constitution’s allocation of regulatory authority over interstate commerce to Congress, states and
Congress have concurrent authority to regulate interstate commerce.
7. Congress has the power to enact laws relating to admiralty44 and laws governing interstate disputes concerning such
matters as water pollution.45 Yet there also is a “tradition of
federal common lawmaking in admiralty,”46 as well as a “federal common law of nuisance” regarding interstate waters.47 Accordingly, Congress and federal courts have concurrent authority to create the rules of admiralty, as well as the rules that
govern many interstate controversies.
C. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS
For purposes of fully understanding concurrence, it will
first prove useful to introduce three analytical tools. This subpart then considers concurrence’s relation to three familiar
constitutional principles: checks and balances, the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and the concept of enumerated powers.
1. Three Analytical Tools
a. Same-Effect Versus Same-Source Concurrence
i.

Definition

“Same-effect” concurrence refers to the circumstance where
two institutions have the power to undertake X, but pursuant
to different sources of power. Consider Example 4, above: the
constitutional provision that gives rise to congressional42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
43. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–20 (1851)
(noting that, under certain circumstances, the states have the authority to regulate interstate commerce).
44. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (“Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail
throughout the country.”).
45. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101–02 (1972).
46. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994).
47. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 107.
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executive agreements is not Article II’s treaty power, but is, instead, Article I’s grant of legislative power to Congress.48 Similarly, whereas the President’s power to issue pardons derives
from Article II, Congress’s power to issue immunities stems
from its Commerce Clause powers under Article I.49 Sameeffect concurrence hence describes the situation where two (or
more) of the Constitution’s grants of power overlap with the result that more than one institution has the power to effectuate
act X.
“Same-source” concurrence refers to the situation where
two different institutions exercise the same power. For example, Professor Thomas Merrill is of the view that administrative
agencies exercise the very legislative power that the Constitution grants to Congress.50 Similarly, Professor Henry Monaghan believes that Article I courts can exercise much of the federal judicial power that the Constitution grants to Article III
courts.51
Is it useful to distinguish between “same-effect” and “samesource” concurrence? Yes, but the distinction is less important
than courts and scholars assume. The rest of this subpart discusses several Supreme Court opinions and scholarly works
that have assumed the distinction to be crucial, and then considers to what extent the distinction really should matter after
all.
ii. Judicial and Scholarly Reliance on the Distinction
Many court opinions and scholars presume the importance
of the distinction between same-effect and same-source concurrence. Consider the long-standing controversy as to whether
non-Article III courts exercise Article III judicial power, or
something else. Embracing same-effect concurrence, Chief Justice Marshall famously upheld territorial courts on the ground
that they are incapable of receiving Article III judicial power,
48. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 804 –05 (stating that Congress may approve congressional-executive agreements by passing “an ordinary statute or a joint resolution, or enact[ing] implementing legislation necessary for the agreement’s legal effectiveness” (footnote omitted)).
49. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896) (stating that the statute in question, which was passed by Congress under its Commerce Clause
power, was “virtually an act of general amnesty”).
50. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2181 (2004).
51. See Monaghan, supra note 26, at 868 (“[S]ignificant federal adjudication [can] occur in non-Article III tribunals.”).
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and that, instead, they exercise something other than Article
III judicial power.52 The modern Court, by contrast, has come
asymptotically close to adopting same-source concurrence when
concluding that Congress may “authorize the adjudication of
Article III business in a non-Article III tribunal,” provided that
the congressional decision does not impermissibly threaten “the
institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”53 Professor Monaghan likewise happily describes today’s “system of shared adjudication between agencies and Article III courts.”54 Against
this current of same-source concurrence, two excellent recent
works of scholarship—one by Professor James Pfander in the
Harvard Law Review, the other by Professor Caleb Nelson in
the Columbia Law Review—aim to revive Chief Justice Marshall’s same-effect concurrence.55 Both of these sophisticated
articles aim to establish that non-Article III tribunals are constitutional because they do not exercise Article III judicial power, but, instead, exercise some other power.56
A similar battle between same-effect and same-source concurrence appears in the nondelegation context. Undertaking an
approach structurally identical to Professors Pfander and Nelson, Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule conclude that
the powers exercised by agencies are fully constitutional because agencies never exercise Article I legislative powers.57
Posner and Vermeule acknowledge that agency rulemaking
may be functionally equivalent to lawmaking so far as the citizen is concerned, but they claim that agency rulemaking cannot
constitute an exercise of legislative power because legislative
power refers only to the power to enact statutes.58 Professor
Merrill, by contrast, argues on behalf of same-source concurrence: Merrill criticizes Posner and Vermeule’s idiosyncratical52. See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828); see also
infra Part II.C (discussing Canter fully).
53. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986).
54. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 873 (emphasis added).
55. See Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 559, 565 (2007); Pfander, supra note 22, at 775.
56. See Nelson, supra note 55, at 564 –65 (concluding that “core private
rights” can only be adjudicated in Article III courts, and that non-Article III
courts adjudicate other matters); Pfander, supra note 22, at 650–51 (arguing
that what typically are called “Article I courts” actually have the status of nonArticle III “tribunals” that cannot exercise federal judicial power).
57. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1756 (2002).
58. See id. at 1746, 1756.
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ly narrow definition of “legislative power”59 and concludes that
the power exercised by agencies indeed constitutes legislative
power.60
As a formal matter, contemporary case law treats agency
powers as an aspect of same-effect concurrence, insisting that
Article I’s “text permits no delegation of those [legislative] powers.”61 Justices Stevens and Souter reject this same-effect account of agency power and, instead, embrace same-source concurrence; they have criticized the Court for “pretend[ing]
. . . that the authority delegated” to an administrative agency
“is somehow not ‘legislative power,’” advocating instead that “it
would be both wiser and more faithful to what we have actually
done in delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking authority is ‘legislative power.’”62
iii. Reexamining the Reasons for the Distinction
Two justifications underlie the claim that the distinction
between same-source and same-effect concurrence is significant.
First, same-effect concurrence is thought to be acceptable
on the ground that there is nothing inherently problematic for
two institutions with different sources of power to have powers
that overlap.63 For example, it is utterly uncontroversial that
both federal courts (which receive their power from Article III
of the Constitution and federal statutes) and state courts
(which receive their powers from state constitutions and state
legislation) have the power to adjudicate contract disputes of
more than $75,000 between citizens of two different states.

59. Merrill, supra note 50, at 2125 (noting that “[t]here is no support in
decisional law for” Posner’s and Vermeule’s formal definition of legislative
power as the power to enact statutes, and that their definition “is at the very
least idiosyncratic, and probably would be rejected if presented to the courts”).
60. See id. at 2165 (arguing that “the nondelegation doctrine . . . should be
rejected” and that “the Court should repudiate the idea that Article I, Section 1 precludes any congressional sharing of legislative power” (emphasis
added)).
61. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
62. Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting) (adopting a similar approach and explaining that “by
virtue of congressional delegation, legislative power can be exercised by independent agencies and Executive departments without the passage of new legislation”).
63. See Nelson, supra note 55, at 561.

2010]

FROM EXCLUSIVITY TO CONCURRENCE

1065

There is force to this first reason, but it has limits. As a descriptive matter, same-effect concurrence has not been immune
to sharp criticism. For example, Madison’s words in Helvidius
Number II—reproduced, in part, in this Article’s opening paragraph and fully analyzed in Part I.D—were penned as an argument against same-effect concurrence: Madison argued that
Congress had power to interpret a mutual defense treaty under
its powers to declare war and that the President, accordingly,
did not have power to interpret the treaty under any of his constitutional powers.64 Similarly, the recent battle between Professors Ackerman and Golove, on the one hand, and Professor
Tribe, on the other, with respect to the constitutionality of congressional-executive agreements, concerned the legitimacy of
same-effect concurrence.65 Neither the defenders nor the critics
suggested that congressional-executive agreements were based
on the treaty power. Rather, the debates centered on whether a
power to create congressional-executive agreements premised
on Congress’s Article I powers can coexist with the treaty power—in other words, the constitutionality of same-effect concurrence.66
The Pacificus-Helvidius debates and the dispute surrounding congressional-executive agreements prove that same-effect
concurrence is not immune from controversy. But, one might
ask, why should same-effect concurrence ever be controversial?
Two answers suggest themselves. First, the activity in question
may appear to more readily fit under one of the two powers,
opening the door to arguments based on expressio unius est exclusio alterius67 and raising fears that some troublesome extension of governmental power is at work.68 Second, if two or more
institutions have the power to do X, then it is possible that the
institutions will decide to act differently and thereby create a
conflict.69 For reasons explained later, neither of these objections is an adequate basis for flatly rejecting same-effect con64. MADISON, supra note 1, at 67.
65. Compare Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 803, with Laurence H.
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method
in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1275 (1995).
66. See supra note 65.
67. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 65, at 1241–43. For an examination of this
canon, see infra Part I.C.2.
68. This is the core of Professor Tribe’s sharp critique of congressionalexecutive agreements. See Tribe, supra note 65, at 1302–03.
69. This concern permeates Madison’s discussion. See MADISON, supra
note 1, at 66–69.

1066

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[94:1051

currence,70 though they do explain why same-effect concurrence
can legitimately be controversial.
The second reason cited for drawing a sharp line between
same-source and same-effect concurrence is that same-source
concurrence sometimes is said to render the Constitution “mere
surplusage.”71 To provide two examples: if the Constitution
goes out of its way to provide special protections for those who
exercise the judicial power (life tenure and salary guarantees),72 how can the same judicial power be exercised by judges
lacking such protections? And, if the Constitution provides special procedures that must be followed for legislation to be
enacted,73 how can the same legislative power be exercised by
different institutions and different procedures? To put the matter a bit differently, allowing judicial power to be exercised outside of Article III courts or the legislative power to be exercised
outside of Congress could be said to sanction an end-run
around the Constitution’s specifications. This is yet another
way of saying that same-source concurrence violates the canon
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
There are two strong counterarguments to this second concern. First, there is a plausible textual argument that the Constitution generally permits the delegations of power that give
rise to same-source concurrence. This can be seen by generalizing the arguments that have been separately made by Professors Thomas Merrill and Cass Sunstein in the nondelegation
context. Merrill argues that agencies properly exercise actual
legislative power,74 thereby forthrightly defending same-source
concurrence. Merrill’s argument demonstrates that the Constitution’s text almost always can be plausibly construed to permit concurrence, even when the Constitution allocates power to
only one institution. After all, one might think that Article I,
Section 1 provides a particularly strong textual basis for embracing exclusivity as regards legislative power: its language
that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress” quite plausibly could be said to require that all legislative power vests only in Congress.75 Yet Merrill resists this
70. See infra Part IV (discussing all or nothing), infra Part V (discussing
conflicts).
71. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
72. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
73. See id. art. I, § 7.
74. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 2127.
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
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conclusion because the “text of the Constitution is . . . silent on
the question whether or to what extent legislative power may
be shared.”76 Cass Sunstein has made the same argument: “The
Constitution does grant legislative power to Congress, but it
does not in terms forbid delegations of that power.”77
Merrill’s and Sunstein’s arguments can be generalized
beyond the nondelegation context because, with only a handful
of exceptions,78 the Constitution’s grants of power are not accompanied by prohibitions on the delegation of the allocated
power.79 It follows that the constitutional text almost never forecloses delegations that can result in what Merrill calls
“shared” power80 and what this Article dubs “same-source concurrence.”81
At their core, Merrill’s and Sunstein’s arguments constitute a rejection of a categorical application of expressio unius
76. Merrill, supra note 50, at 2127; cf. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S.
748, 776 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting a nondelegation challenge on
the ground that the Constitution “does not set forth any special limitation on
Congress’s assigning to the President the task of implementing the laws
enacted pursuant to [Congress’s powers to make rules for the land and naval
forces]”).
77. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322
(2000) (emphasis added).
78. The sole exceptions can be found in Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of
the Constitution, which specifies a handful of actions (such as entering into
treaties and coining money) that federal institutions may undertake but that
states may not. That the activities identified in Clause 1 are flatly prohibited
to states, and may not be delegated to states, is all but impossible to deny on
account of the Constitution’s next two clauses, which specify activities that
states shall not do “without the Consent of the Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1–3.
79. For an extended critique of delegation, see Alexander & Prakash, supra note 18.
80. Merrill, supra note 50, at 2116. Furthermore, Merrill appears to be of
the view that there sometimes can be “shared” powers even without delegation. Merrill believes that institutions apart from Congress have no inherent
legislative power (the “anti-inherency principle,” id. at 2101), and that there
accordingly can be shared legislative powers only pursuant to congressional
delegations, on account of Article I, Section 1’s specification that the legislative
powers “herein” granted are vested in Congress. See id. (“[T]he reference to
legislative powers ‘herein’ granted can be understood to limit the antiinherency principle to those powers granted in Article I itself.”). This suggests
that legislative powers granted to Congress outside of Article I (perhaps, for
instance, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment) may be shared by
institutions apart from Congress even without a delegation from Congress.
81. Indeed, the broad implications of Merrill’s argument vis-à-vis delegations of other powers led Larry Alexander and Sai Prakash to pen something
of a slippery slope discourse. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 18. I respond to their argument in Part IV.
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est exclusio alterius.82 Specifically, their arguments assume
that constitutional specification alone (i.e., absent an express
statement of nondelegation) does not mean that only the specified institution may undertake the activity in question. I revisit
(and defend) this proposition later in Part VI after canvassing
the degree of concurrence present in contemporary American
constitutional law. For now, though, it is important to note the
dangers that are entailed by their (and my) position. While it is
true that the Constitution generally does not contain antidelegation provisions, construing this as a general license to delegate could be criticized as opening the door to wholesale evasion of the Constitution’s carefully crafted mechanisms.83 After
all, delegation (almost) always substitutes a less demanding
procedure for accomplishing X than what the Constitution specifies; indeed, this is typically the motivation behind concurrence. For example, congressional-executive agreements are
pursued because there is insufficient senatorial support for a
treaty, and territorial courts rather than Article III courts were
created so that their judges did not have to have life tenure.84 I
acknowledge these concerns and dangers but, for reasons explained in Part IV, I reject the suggestion that they are appropriately addressed by adopting a categorical canon of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.
The second counterargument is that the “mere surplusage”
concerns discussed above are not addressed simply by showing
that an institutional arrangement is an instance of same-effect
rather than same-source concurrence. On this second approach,
the only way to give life to the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and the only way to ensure that the Constitution’s language is not made “mere surplusage,” is to conclude
that same-effect concurrence is also impermissible. For instance, how are the concerns articulated above ameliorated by
concluding that territorial courts exercise Article I rather than
Article III power?
There are three plausible responses to the second counterargument. The first is to reject it by concluding that it does
make a constitutional difference as to whether Article I courts
exercise Article III judicial power or something else. On this
82. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 2101–02; Sunstein, supra note 77, at
322.
83. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 18, at 1036–39.
84. For an in-depth discussion of this point, see Glidden Co. v. Zdanock,
370 U.S. 530, 544 –45 (1962); see also infra Part III.B.1 (discussing Glidden).

2010]

FROM EXCLUSIVITY TO CONCURRENCE

1069

view, the distinction between same-source and same-effect concurrence remains important, and only same-effect concurrence
is permissible. This type of rationale is more likely to be compelling to formalists than to functionalists.
Responses two and three are likely to appeal to functionalists. The second response is that the “mere surplusage” concerns only can be addressed by rejecting all forms of concurrence, and to conclude accordingly that only exclusivity is
permissible. The third response—diametrically opposed to the
second—is to conclude that sometimes constitutional provisions
are effectively rendered “mere surplusage” and to then conclude
that both same-effect and same-source concurrence are potentially permissible. For those functionalists to whom either responses two or three are appealing, the actual practice of American constitutional law is likely to be relevant in deciding
between the two possibilities. For this reason, I shall delay further consideration of this question, and instead will proceed
with a survey of concurrence in American law.
To conclude, it is not necessary for present purposes to fully settle the question of whether and to what extent the distinction between same-source and same-effect concurrence matters.
What does matter, however, are the following two conclusions:
(1) the distinction may matter to some, and for these people
some forms of concurrence are constitutionally permissible; and
(2) whether concurrence is permissible to those who think that
the distinction is not significant likely turns, at least in part, on
past and contemporary practice.
b. Nonidenticality
A second principle relevant to this Article’s analysis is that
concurrence does not mean that the two institutions’ acts are
wholly identical. This “nonidenticality principle” is true of both
same-source and same-effect concurrence. In general, the acts
of institutions with concurrent power are nonidentical with regard to both (1) what must happen to effectuate the act and (2)
what must happen to negate the act. There sometimes are additional distinctions between the “concurrent” acts. For instance, administrative regulations are not identical to statutes.85 Though they share much in common—for instance,
85. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with
the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 477–78
(2002) (“Legislative rules . . . have the force and effect of law . . . akin to that of
a statute. Nonlegislative rules do not have the force and effect of law; rather,
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from the vantage point of most citizens, the legal obligations
they impose are indistinguishable—administrative regulations
do not appear in United States Statutes at Large, they are
brought into existence by the actions of two different institutions (Congress or an agency), and they typically are easier to
amend or rescind than statutes.86 Consider, as well, the relation between actual constitutional amendments and what popularly are called judicial amendments by the Court. The latter
might be less permanent than formal Article V amendments
since they can be reversed by a simple majority of Supreme
Court Justices.87
c. Imperfect Overlap
A third relevant principle is that concurrence does not necessarily entail perfect overlap between the powers of the two
institutions.88 To the contrary, there typically is imperfect overlap between the two.89 For example, the early twentieth century case of Missouri v. Holland established that treaties “may
deal with a subject that Congress could not regulate by legislation in the absence of treaty.”90 Though the scope of Congress’s
powers has significantly expanded since the twentieth century,91 there still might be some subjects relating to interna-

they are simply statements about what an agency intends to do in the future.”).
86. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions: A Research Agenda, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 399, 409
(2008) (“Statutes are certainly harder to amend than administrative regulations . . . .”).
87. Cf. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 155 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing the dangers associated with judicial amendments).
88. See Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating the Commander in Chief: Some
Theories, 81 IND. L.J. 1319, 1320 (2006) (discussing the overlap, or lack thereof, between the powers of Congress and the President as Commander-inChief ).
89. See id. at 1321 (“It is possible to suppose that the two powers overlap
in some ways, but that each also has an exclusive sphere.” (footnote omitted)).
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. c (1986) (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920)).
91. Indeed, the subject addressed in Holland that was then viewed as falling outside the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers today could be
regulated under the Commerce Clause. See Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 1105, 1117
(2008) (“Missouri v. Holland is famous (and contested) today for the proposition that the Senate can use its treaty power to do what is otherwise beyond
its power, but within a few decades after the opinion was issued, . . . Con-
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tional relations that do not fall within Congress’s enumerated
powers. Accordingly, there is imperfect overlap between the
treaty power and congressional-executive agreements.
2. Concurrence’s Relation to Three Familiar Constitutional
Principles
Three familiar concepts in constitutional law might be
thought to have some connection to concurrence: checks and
balances, the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and
enumerated powers.
a. Checks and Balances
To begin, “concurrence” and “checks and balances” are distinct concepts. Whereas “concurrence” refers to the situation
where two (or more) different institutions each have the power
to undertake X, “checks and balances” refers to the situation
where two (or more) institutions have distinctive roles in completing act X. So, for instance, the President’s veto power is an
aspect of checks and balances, but is not an example of concurrence.92 The same is true of the Senate’s role in approving appointments of officers.93
b. Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius
Second, consider the canon of constitutional construction
known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or “to express or
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.”94 Here
there indeed is a tension. Concurrence—in many of its forms—
is orthogonally opposed to expressio unius. The tension is keen
with same-source concurrence. When the Constitution allocates
federal judicial power to Article III courts, application of the
canon of expressio unius would mean that only federal courts
can exercise that power. The Court’s conclusion that Congress
may “authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-

gress’s powers under the Commerce Clause had been reconceived to be capacious.” (footnote omitted)).
92. See Arthur A. Rizer III, The Filibuster of Judicial Nominations: Constitutional Crisis or Politics as Usual?, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 847, 866 (2005) (“The
President’s veto is one of the most significant powers in the ‘checks and balances’ form of government.”).
93. Madison draws a similar distinction in the Helvidius Number II. See
MADISON, supra note 1, at 68 (“In executive acts, the legislature, or at least a
branch of it, may participate, as in the appointment to offices.”).
94. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009).
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Article III tribunal”95 reflects a decision not to invoke the canon. That expressio unius was not invoked is not particularly
troubling or surprising—at least since the time of Karl Llewelyn it has been widely understood that canons of interpretation are selectively invoked.96 Yet it is important to recognize it.
Among other things, understanding when a canon is invoked—
and when it is not—is crucial to recognizing the canon’s true
strength.
Expressio unius also is inconsistent with many instances of
same-effect concurrence. For example, under the canon, the
Constitution’s allocation of the pardon power to the President
would mean that Congress does not have a functionally identical power to issue immunities under the Commerce Clause.97
The Court, however, has held that Congress does have such a
power (Example 3 in Part I.B, above)—against a dissent sounding in expressio unius in its insistence that “Congress cannot
grant a pardon” because pardons are “the sole prerogative of
the President to grant.”98 On the other hand, expressio unius is
not implicated in the circumstance of same-effect concurrence
that arises where both institutions claim authorization from
only very general power grants. In that circumstance, there is
no expressio unius.
There is one other type of concurrence that also is not inconsistent with expressio unius. As explained later,99 concurrence frequently is created when the institution with the power
to do X delegates some of that power to another institution—
consider in this regard Congress’s grant of rulemaking power to
agencies (Example 5 in Part I.B, above). Expressio unius, on its
own, is not inconsistent with the constitutionally empowered
institution’s delegation of some power. At most, an antidelegation rule is a plausible, but by no means inevitable, inference
from the principle of expressio unius.
95. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986).
96. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 401–06 (1950).
97. Consider as well congressional-executive agreements (Example 4, supra Part I.B). The Constitution’s specification that international obligations be
created via the treaty would be most naturally interpreted, upon application of
expressio unius, that international obligations cannot be made pursuant to
other more general grants of congressional power (such as the power to regulate foreign commerce).
98. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 638 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting).
99. See infra Part III.A.1.

2010]

FROM EXCLUSIVITY TO CONCURRENCE

1073

The short of it is this: much of the time, though not always,
concurrence reflects a context-specific repudiation of the canon
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. I return to a fuller consideration of the constitutional implications of this point in
Part VI.
c. Enumerated Powers
Concurrence bears a subtle relation to the concept of enumerated powers. “Enumerated powers” typically is understood
to mean that the federal government is a government of only
the limited powers spelled out in the Constitution.100 On the
one hand, it might be thought that concurrence bears no relation to enumerated powers; whether the powers given to the
federal government are exercisable exclusively or concurrently
bears no relation to the concept of enumerated powers so long
as the powers indeed were enumerated.
On the other hand, concurrence that is created by delegation can be said to implicate enumerated powers when the delegatee is more readily able to exercise the power than the delegator. For instance, enumerated powers may not only mean
that the federal government can regulate interstate commerce,
but also that the federal government was given the power to
regulate interstate commerce only by means of the specific procedure laid down in Article I.101 On this view, the fact that it is
difficult to enact legislation, and that Congress could not have
generated all the rules found in the Federal Register, would
mean that the proliferation of federal regulations made possible
by Congress’s rulemaking delegations represents a breach of
the concept of enumerated powers, even if congressional power
extends to each and every regulation enacted by an agency.
It is advisable to fully analyze enumerated powers after
having comprehensively examined the phenomenon of concurrence. I accordingly return to this topic in Part VI.
D. THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES
The earliest debate concerning the choice between exclusivity and concurrence—and, perhaps surprisingly, still the most
extended discussion of this issue to date—is found in the ex100. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Every law
enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated
in the Constitution.”).
101. For an extensive development of this line of argumentation in relation
to sole executive agreements, see generally Clark, supra note 32.
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change between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
known as the Pacificus-Helvidius debates. The occasion for the
debates was President Washington’s issuance of the Neutrality
Proclamation of 1793.102 In declaring the new nation’s neutrality vis-à-vis France’s war with Great Britain and Holland, President Washington’s Proclamation interpreted the 1778 Treaty
of Alliance with France.103
The question dividing Hamilton and Madison was whether
the President had constitutional authority to interpret the
Treaty. Madison, writing under the name “Helvidius” and using the words reproduced in this Article’s first paragraph, took
the exclusivist position, arguing that only Congress had power
to interpret the Treaty on account of its power to declare war.
Writing under the pseudonym of “Pacificus,” Hamilton defended the Proclamation’s legality, adopting what this Article
dubs “concurrence” in arguing that both the President and
Congress had power to interpret the Treaty.104
Hamilton acknowledged that Congress had the power to
interpret the Treaty pursuant to its power to declare war, but
urged that the President also had the power to interpret the
Treaty under the President’s executive powers:
[H]owever true it may be, that th〈e〉 right of the Legislature to declare
wa〈r〉 includes the right of judging whether the N〈ation〉 be under obligations to make War or not—it will not follow that the Executive is
in any case excluded from a similar right of Judgment, in the execution of its own functions.105

This is a defense of same-effect concurrence insofar as Hamilton believed that the source of the President’s power to issue
the Proclamation was the Vesting Clause106 and that Congress’s interpretive powers derived from the Declare War
Clause.107
102. For a good introduction, see Morton J. Frisch, Introduction to THE PAnote 1, at vii, vii.
103. See id.
104. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, PACIFICUS NUMBER I, reprinted in THE
PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794, supra note 1, at 13.
105. See id. (emphasis added).
106. See id. at 16. Though this construction of the Vesting Clause was controversial then and remains disputed today, that issue is not relevant to this
Article’s concern of whether power is allocated on an exclusive or concurrent
basis.
107. Hamilton’s understanding of concurrence was not tied to his view of
the Vesting Clause as shown by the fact that he presents a hypothetical in
which the President interprets a treaty pursuant to his powers under the Recognition Clause and Congress also has the power under the Declare War
Clause to interpret the treaty. Hamilton fully understood the import of his arCIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794, supra

2010]

FROM EXCLUSIVITY TO CONCURRENCE

1075

Madison vehemently disagreed with Hamilton’s embrace of
concurrence, dedicating the bulk of his Helvidius Number II to
disputing it. His position boils down to two arguments. First,
Madison claims to identify a “material error” in Hamilton’s position insofar as (Madison claims) Hamilton failed to fully apply
his own principles:
He had before admitted that the right to declare war . . . includes
the right to judge whether the United States be obliged to declare war
or not. Can the inference be avoided, that the executive instead of having a similar right to judge, is as much excluded from the right to
judge as from the right to declare?108

Madison says that the “inference” (that the President can neither interpret the Treaty nor declare war) cannot be avoided,
but why not? Madison does not further explain his position. His
argument, it would seem, boils down to ipse dixit assertion of
exclusivity—which does not amount to an argument at all insofar as it is the very principle he aims to establish. Two paragraphs later Madison tries again to drive home the same point,
but with no greater success. Madison asserts that Hamilton:
[C]annot disentangle himself by considering the right of the executive
to judge as concurrent with that of the legislature. For if the executive
have a concurrent right to judge, and the right to judge be included in
(it is in fact the very essence of ) the right to declare, he must go on
and say that the executive has a concurrent right also to declare.109

But why is this so if, as Hamilton hypothesized, the President’s
right to interpret the Treaty derives from an independent presidential power? Under Hamilton’s approach, after all, it is perfectly conceivable that an independent presidential power could
encompass the “right to judge” but not the “right to declare.”110
For this reason, Madison’s argument here is wholly unavailing.
Madison’s second justification for opposing concurrence is
more substantive. The trouble with concurrence, he rightly observes, is that it opens the door to conflicts:
If the legislature and executive have both a right to judge of the
obligations to make war or not, it must sometimes happen . . . that
they will judge differently. . . .
....

gument—that two institutions could have the power to undertake the same
act—and Hamilton in fact adopted virtually the same term that this Article
uses, writing that “there results . . . a concurrent authority” as between the
President and Congress. See id. at 15.
108. MADISON, supra note 1, at 66 (emphasis added).
109. Id. (second emphasis added).
110. Id.
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In what light does this present the constitution to the people who
established it? In what light would it present to the world, a nation,
thus speaking, thro’ two different organs, equally constitutional and
authentic, two opposite languages, on the same subject and under the
same existing circumstances?111

Hamilton had a response to Madison’s argument that I discuss in Part V,112 which examines six different mechanisms
found in American law for resolving conflicts among institutions with overlapping power. As will be shown, Hamilton’s response tracks one of the six mechanisms.
*****
Having defined “concurrence” and “exclusivity” and introduced the concepts of same-source concurrence, same-effect
concurrence, nonidenticality, and imperfect overlap, we are
ready to proceed to examine many intriguing patterns.
II. THE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY FROM EXCLUSIVITY
TO CONCURRENCE
A study of Supreme Court case law reveals the tenacity of
exclusivist assumptions. The judiciary virtually always adopts
exclusivist assumptions and opposes claims that power can be
concurrently exercised. Though the Court generally has come to
acknowledge concurrence, judicial acceptance has not initiated
the concurrent exercise of power but instead has been a belated
recognition of a widespread practice that has taken root outside
the courtroom.113 In some other contexts, the Court has created
doctrines that formally cling to exclusivity notwithstanding the
fact that virtually all scholars acknowledge that two institutions exercise concurrent powers.114
The bottom line is that there is a clear trajectory in both
practice and doctrine: initial exclusivist assumptions consistently, though not universally, have given way to concur-

111. Id. at 69.
112. See infra Part V.B.
113. In other words, there has been an “interaction between the courts and
the political branches in the creation of constitutional meaning.” Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation Outside the Courts, 37 J. INTERDISC. HIST.
415, 418 (2007). See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999). Though
Tushnet’s words are directed to early nineteenth-century events, this Article
shows that the same phenomenon has continued up to the present.
114. See infra Part II.D.

2010]

FROM EXCLUSIVITY TO CONCURRENCE

1077

rence.115 On the other hand, as Part II.H documents, there are
many contexts where exclusivist assumptions have been unchallenged, and at least one instance of a partial countertrajectory where the Supreme Court has cut back on concurrence and
turned back to exclusivity.
A. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE VARIOUS FEDERAL COURTS:
THE ROAD FROM MARBURY TO AMES
The substantive constitutional issue raised in Marbury v.
Madison116 is both an early illustration of the choice between
exclusivity or concurrence and an exemplar of the Court’s initial approach to answering the query. The Constitution provides that “[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a
Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In
all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction.”117 The (still to be created) inferior
federal courts and/or state courts had original jurisdiction over
other matters that fell within the scope of Article III’s judicial
power.
The substantive question famously presented in Marbury
was whether Congress could expand the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond the three categories enumerated in the
Constitution.118 The issue raised in the case clearly fell within
the “judicial Power of the United States,”119 and the case itself
clearly fell within the original jurisdiction of the inferior courts
that Congress had established. This is the respect in which
Marbury presented the Court with the choice between exclusivity and concurrence: Marbury presented the question of whether the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction could be made to
overlap with the inferior federal courts’ original jurisdiction.
The Marbury Court specifically considered the question of
whether Congress could “assign original jurisdiction to [the Supreme Court] in other cases than those specified in” the Consti115. See Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
781, 790 (2008) (discussing the “general trajectory” away from exclusivity to
concurrence).
116. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
117. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
118. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175.
119. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The issue in the case concerned a question of
federal law: the legal effect of a commission for public justice that the President had signed after the Senate’s advice and consent.
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tution.120 The Court rejected this proposition, explaining: “Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other
objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them, or they have no operation
at all.”121 As others have noted, Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning here is an example of expressio unius est exclusio alterius122: from the fact that the Constitution “apportion[ed] the
judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts,”123
Marshall concluded that only the institution that had been constitutionally allocated original jurisdiction could exercise original jurisdiction.124 Any other interpretation would render the
Constitution’s language “mere surplusage.”125 Chief Justice
Marshall’s chief justification for Marbury’s substantive holding
accordingly was an exclusivist argument.
My intention here is not to suggest that the Court incorrectly decided this portion of Marbury,126 but instead to show
that its exclusivist justification has not fared well. Consider in
this regard the Court’s decision in Ames v. Kansas.127 Kansas
had sued several corporations in Kansas state courts, and defendants had removed to an inferior federal court in reliance on
the federal question statute, which granted inferior federal
courts jurisdiction over cases raising questions of federal law.128
At issue in Ames was the constitutionality of the federal question statute’s application to a case in which a state was a party:
could Congress assign original jurisdiction to an inferior federal
120. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174.
121. Id.
122. See Tribe, supra note 65, at 1275.
123. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Indeed, there was strong constitutional language on which the Chief
Justice could have relied. After enumerating the cases in which the Supreme
Court is to have original jurisdiction, Article III provides that “[i]n all the other cases . . . , the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Extending the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction to include mandamus correspondingly diminishes its appellate jurisdiction and hence could be said to run afoul of this constitutional language.
On the other hand, the very last phrase of the above sentence from Article III
appears to grant Congress the power to make “Exceptions” to the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Id. For a collection of sources that examine
these competing textual arguments, see James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1515, 1517 & n.5 (2001).
127. 111 U.S. 449 (1884).
128. See id. at 462–63.
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court given the fact that the Constitution granted the Supreme
Court “original Jurisdiction” in “all Cases . . . in which a State
shall be Party”?129
The Court in Ames acknowledged that Marbury “used language . . . which might, perhaps, imply that such original jurisdiction as had been granted by the Constitution was exclusive.”130 On this approach, the Supreme Court alone (among
federal courts) would have had original jurisdiction over cases
such as this in which a state was a party.
But Ames rejected Marbury’s approach and upheld Congress’s power to grant inferior courts original jurisdiction over
the same subjects that fall within the Supreme Court’s constitutionally granted original jurisdiction.131 Instead of Marbury’s
exclusivity, Ames reasoned as follows:
[T]he grant of jurisdiction over a certain subject matter to one court
does not, of itself, imply that that jurisdiction is to be exclusive. In the
clause in question [in the Constitution] there is nothing but mere affirmative words of grant, and none that import a design to exclude the
subordinate jurisdiction of other courts of the United States on the
same subject matter.132

The italicized language, it should be noted, is precisely the
same type of argument that Professors Merrill and Sunstein
have made in defense of Congress’s powers to delegate legislative authority to agencies.133
Three important lessons emerge from considering the relationship between Ames’s rationale and Marbury’s reasoning.
First, the two are at loggerheads. Marbury instructs that the
Constitution’s grants of power are conclusively presumed to be
exclusive. Otherwise, said Chief Justice Marshall, the Constitution’s language would be “mere surplusage.”134 Ames, by contrast, strips any presumption of exclusivity from the Constitution’s grant of power to a particular institution.
Second, insofar as much of the Constitution’s text consists
of affirmative grants of power to particular institutions, the in129. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
130. Ames, 111 U.S. at 467.
131. See id. at 447 (“[W]e are unable to say that it is not within the power
of Congress to grant to the inferior courts of the United States jurisdiction in
cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by the constitution with original jurisdiction.”).
132. Id. at 468 (quoting Gittings v. Crawford, 10 F. Cas. 447, 450 (C.C.D.
Md. 1838) (No. 5465) (emphasis added)).
133. See supra Part I.C.1.a.
134. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
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terpretive question that both Marbury and Ames address—
whether the Constitution’s affirmative grant of power is to be
construed as a constitutional mandate that only that institution has the specified power—is pervasive.
Third, and finally, Ames’s and Marbury’s contrary resolutions to the interpretive question strongly suggest that constitutional text alone does not answer the question of whether
constitutional grants are exclusive. How then is the decision to
be made as to whether the Constitution’s power grants are exclusive or potentially concurrent? This important question will
be taken up in Part III.
B. FACT-FINDING IN CIVIL ADJUDICATION: OF JURIES, JUDGES,
AND NON-ARTICLE III ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS
The Seventh Amendment allocates power to juries, granting them the power to “tr[y] . . . fact[s] . . . [i]n Suits at common
law.”135 The Seventh Amendment simultaneously limits the
power of federal judges, providing that courts are not permitted
to reexamine the jury’s findings “otherwise . . . than according
to the rules of the common law.”136 The Court long has held
that “common law” for these purposes refers to the procedures
for reexamining jury verdicts that were available in English
common law in 1791, when the Seventh Amendment was
adopted.137
This subpart examines how an exclusivist regime in which
only juries had the power to find facts was transformed into a
system of concurrence in which adjudicatory fact-finding authority is held jointly by juries, Article III judges, and judges in
non-Article III courts. Subpart 1 examines the trajectory from
exclusivity to concurrence as between juries and Article III
judges. To this day, the Court has been reluctant to formally
acknowledge the concurrence that exists. Subpart 2 examines
the trajectory from exclusivity to concurrence as between juries
and Article I tribunals, where a different story appears: after
initially denying and thereafter seeking to tightly cabin concur135. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 435–36,
& 436 n.20 (1996). While riding circuit, Justice Story was among the first of
the American jurists to equate the Seventh Amendment’s language of “common law” with the “common law of England.” United States v. Wonson, 28 F.
Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750); see also Slocum v. N.Y. Life
Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377 (1913) (quoting approvingly this language from
Justice Story’s Wonson opinion).
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rence, the Court ultimately came to frankly acknowledge the
existence of significant concurrence.
1. Juries and Judges
Professor Suja Thomas has shown that English common
law as of 1791 adopted what this Article dubs an “exclusivist”
allocation of duties in which only the jury, not the judge, had
the power to find facts.138 Early American jurisprudence
tracked England’s exclusivist approach to dividing power between judge and jury. The early twentieth-century case of Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.139 and the cases on which it
relied are representative. Before 1938, a federal statute directed federal courts to apply state procedural rules in diversity
suits.140 Pennsylvania law at the time of the Slocum decision
permitted what today would be called judgment as a matter of
law: Pennsylvania procedure authorized judges to disregard a
jury’s verdict for insufficient evidence and instead to directly

138. See Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93
VA. L. REV. 139, 143 (2007) (showing that only “the jury or the parties determined the facts,” not the judge, under English common law at the time of
1791). Under three common law procedures, neither the judge nor jury found
facts: instead, the parties stipulated to the facts (the “demurrer to the pleadings,” the “demurrer to the evidence,” and the “special case” under the parties’
agreement as to the facts), and the judge thereafter applied the law to the stipulated facts. See id. at 148–54, 156–57. Under the demurrer to the pleadings
and demurrer to the evidence, one party admitted to the facts alleged by the
other party (the former after the pleadings had been filed, the latter during
the trial itself ). See id. at 148–54. Under the special case, the parties could
jointly stipulate to specific facts. See id. at 156–57. Under the other common
law procedures, the jury’s finding of facts provided the ground for the case’s
outcome. In the special case following a jury’s general verdict, the court decided a disputed question of law but used the jury’s findings of fact. Common
law courts could grant motions for a new trial on the ground that the evidence
did not support the jury’s verdict, but the result was a new trial during which
time a (new) jury would find the facts. See id. at 157–58. Finally, under a compulsory nonsuit, a common law court could enter judgment for a defendant following jury verdict for plaintiff, but “only if the jury’s verdict was unsupported
as to a particular matter of law.” Id. at 155. Of particular relevance to the discussion above, insufficient evidence was not a basis for a compulsory nonsuit.
See id.
139. 228 U.S. at 382 (“To the [court] is committed a power of direction and
superintendence, and to the [jury] the ultimate determination of the issues of
fact. Only through the coöperation of the two, each acting within its appropriate sphere, can the constitutional right be satisfied.”).
140. See Practice Conformity Act, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872). For
a discussion, see Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of
Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 583 & n.63 (2003).
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enter judgment for the other party.141 The Slocum Court ruled
that this procedure, when applied by federal courts, violated
the Seventh Amendment.142 The problem was not that the federal court had set aside the verdict, for procedures available
under the common law (such as the motion for new trial) authorized courts to set aside jury verdicts under specific circumstances. The sole problem, according to Slocum, was that Pennsylvania’s procedural rule permitted the judge to “pass on the
issues of fact” by issuing a judgment for the other party.143
The assumption of exclusivity—the notion that the jury’s
and judge’s constitutional duties vis-à-vis facts were wholly distinct and nonoverlapping—pervaded the Slocum decision. The
following statement of the Court is illustrative:
In the trial by jury, the right to which is secured by the Seventh
Amendment, both the court and the jury are essential factors. To the
former is committed a power of direction and superintendence, and to
the latter the ultimate determination of the issues of fact. Only
through the coöperation of the two, each acting within its appropriate
sphere, can the constitutional right be satisfied. And so, to . . . permit
one to disregard the province of the other is to impinge on that
right.144

Indeed, the Slocum Court quoted considerable precedent
that supported its exclusivist conception regarding the division
of labor between judge and jury. In 1812, Justice Story, sitting
as a circuit justice, had observed that “the facts once tried by a
jury are never reexamined, unless a new trial is granted in the
discretion of the court, before which the suit is depending . . . or
unless the judgment of such court is reversed by a superior tribunal.”145 The logic of exclusivity was even more clearly stated
in an 1885 case in which the Supreme Court reversed a federal
court that had awarded judgment for the defendant after the
jury had returned a verdict for the plaintiff because “without a
waiver of the right of trial by jury, by consent of parties, the
court errs if it substitutes itself for the jury, and, passing upon
the effect of the evidence, finds the facts involved in the issue,
141. See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 387–88.
142. See id. at 339 (“This we hold could not be done consistently with the
Seventh Amendment, which not only preserves the common law right of trial
by jury, but expressly forbids that issues of fact settled by such a trial shall be
reëxamined otherwise than ‘according to the rules of the common law.’”).
143. Id. at 387–88.
144. Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
145. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No.
16,750). Justice Story reiterated this understanding while writing for the Supreme Court in Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447–48 (1830).
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and renders judgment thereon.”146 An 1899 Supreme Court decision likewise stated:
The facts there tried and decided cannot be re-ëxamined in any court
of the United Stated States . . . ; no other mode of re-ëxamination is
allowed than upon a new trial, either granted by the court in which
the first trial was had or to which the record was returnable, or ordered by an appellate court for error in law . . . .147

But exclusivity did not hold for long. Two lines of Supreme
Court decisions together had the effect of giving judges significant fact-finding powers. The first line of decisions addressed
the question of when federal courts could keep cases from juries
on the ground that insufficient evidence had been put forward.
The second line of cases concerned what federal courts could do
upon determining the evidence was not legally sufficient. Because this augmentation of the judge’s power occurred without
depriving juries of their fact-finding powers, the result was a
regime in which judges and juries both had fact-finding powers.
As to the first line of cases, the traditional rule was that a
“case must go to the jury unless there was ‘no evidence.’”148 The
Court, in Improvement Co. v. Munson,149 acknowledged (though
derogatorily renamed) the traditional rule, and then proceeded
to “completely repudiate[]”150 it:
Formerly it was held that if there was what is called a scintilla of evidence in support of a case the judge was bound to leave it to the jury,
but recent decisions of high authority have established a more reasonable rule, that in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury,
there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can
properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon
whom the onus of proof is imposed.151

In shifting from one legal test to another,152 the Court opened
the door to judges assuming significant fact-finding powers.
146. Baylis v. Travellers’ Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316, 320–21 (1885) (emphasis
added), quoted in Slocum, 228 U.S. at 386–87.
147. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899), quoted in Slocum,
228 U.S. at 379.
148. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 404 (1943) (Black, J.,
dissenting). There are many examples of the traditional rule. See, e.g., Hickman v. Jones, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 197, 201 (1869) (ruling that where there is no
evidence against the defendant the judge is in error if he does not order the
jury to acquit); Drakely v. Gregg, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 242, 268 (1868) (holding
that the case should go the jury “if the evidence tended to prove the position”
of the party).
149. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442 (1871).
150. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 404 (Black, J., dissenting).
151. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 448 (second emphasis added).
152. The “recent decisions of high authority” on which the Supreme Court
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Under the traditional rule, judges could not fact-find because
the jury heard the case if there was “‘any evidence’ to support a
party’s contention;”153 the judge could keep a matter from the
jury only if there was no evidence to be weighed or analyzed
and hence no facts to be found.154 Munson’s replacement test,
by contrast, authorized judges to keep matters from the jury if
the facts could not “properly” ground a verdict.155
After the Munson rule took root,156 there was little question that federal judges exercised fact-finding powers. This is
well illustrated by the case of Pennsylvania Railroad v. Chamberlain,157 which concerned the propriety of a trial court’s order
that a jury grant a verdict for the defendant. Writing for the
Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand had reversed the district
court’s judgment, ruling that the case should have proceeded to
the jury because there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff.158 Citing to the Munson rule, the Supreme
Court reversed Judge Hand, deciding that the testimony of
plaintiff’s witness could not have supported a verdict for the
plaintiff. A fair reading of the case reveals that the Supreme
Court made credibility determinations and weighed conflicting
evidence.159 The Court tried to rebuff the accusation that it was
finding facts by claiming there was no evidence of a collision insofar as plaintiff’s witness had said he heard a “‘loud crash’”
but did not use the word “collision.”160 This is an utterly unpersuasive reading of the evidentiary record. Plaintiff’s witness,
an experienced train yard worker, testified that he saw a faster-moving nine-car train closely trailing a slower-moving tworelied all were decisions from England that postdated 1791. See id. They accordingly had absolutely no binding authority on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Seventh Amendment.
153. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 404 (Black, J., dissenting).
154. Cf. Greenleaf v. Birth, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 292, 299 (1835) (“Where there
is no evidence tending to prove a particular fact, the court[s] are bound so to
instruct the jury, when requested; but they cannot legally give any instruction
which shall take from the jury the right of weighing the evidence and determining what effect it shall have.”).
155. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 448.
156. For some time after Munson, the Supreme Court continued to recite
the pre-Munson “any evidence” test. See, e.g., Hepner v. United States, 213
U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (summarizing the law as “requiring the court to send a
case to the jury . . . where the evidence is conflicting on any essential point”).
157. 288 U.S. 333 (1933).
158. See Chamberlain v. Pa. R.R., 59 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir. 1932), rev’d,
288 U.S. 333.
159. See Pa. R.R., 288 U.S. at 344.
160. Id. at 338.
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car train, heard a loud crash, and thereafter discovered the decedent’s body.161 This testimony plainly was sufficient to constitute evidence of a collision, and the Court’s holding amounted
to a decision to instead credit the testimony of the defendant’s
witness that there had not been a train crash. Consider as well
the Court’s blatant credibility assessment when it asserted that
“[t]he fact that [the defendant railroad’s] witnesses were employees of the [railroad] . . . does not impair” their testimony.162
The second line of cases responsible for the shift from exclusivity to concurrence of fact-finding authority addressed
what judges were permitted to do upon determining the evidence to be insufficient to support a judgment. Two common
law features had assured that juries, not judges, made ultimate
findings of fact. First, the common law in 1791 did not have a
procedure akin to the directed verdict under which a party
could ask the court to rule in his favor after trial but before the
jury’s verdict.163 Second, although the common law permitted
the losing party to challenge verdicts on grounds of insufficient
evidence, a winning motion netted a new trial before another
jury, not a judge-awarded verdict.
Twentieth century cases eliminated these two limitations,
allowing the judge to wholly circumvent the jury. The Court in
Galloway v. United States164 upheld the directed verdict under
the newly adopted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permitting
the judge to enter judgment after trial but before verdict on the
ground of insufficient evidence.165 And Baltimore & Carolina
Line v. Redman166 held that federal judges could not only disregard a jury’s verdict on grounds of insufficient evidence, but also immediately enter a verdict for the other party—the equiva-

161. See id. at 336–37.
162. Id. at 343. For another example of the Court’s fact-finding, see the discussion of Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943), infra note 168.
163. The common law procedure permitting a party to move for judgment
after trial but before verdict, the demurrer to the evidence, required that the
moving party stipulate to the facts alleged by the nonmoving party. Galloway,
319 U.S. at 390. The judge accordingly did not find facts, but took the facts
stipulated by the moving party and applied the stipulated facts to the law. See
Thomas, supra note 138, at 150–54.
164. 319 U.S. 372.
165. See id. at 389–90; see also Sward, supra note 140, at 599–613 (showing
that earlier decisions had upheld directed verdicts where one of the parties
had offered no evidence at all or where the court was asked to apply undisputed facts to the law).
166. 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
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lent of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.167 A careful
read of both the Galloway and Redman decisions reveals that
these cases (unwittingly) showcased federal judges’ new factfinding powers.168
Finally, fully understanding today’s regime of concurrent
fact-finding authority requires consideration of the all167. Redman predated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, pursuant
to a federal statute then in force, applied the procedures of the state in which
the federal court sat. See id. at 661. Redman was an abrupt break with the
Slocum decision discussed above, which only twenty years before had held
precisely the opposite. To be sure, the Redman Court distinguished Slocum on
the ground that the trial court had not yet decided the defendant’s motion to
dismiss and motion for directed verdict, both of which had been submitted to
the court before the jury began its deliberations. See id. at 658–59. The Second
Circuit had not deemed this technical difference to be material, and even the
Redman Court acknowledged that “some parts of the [Slocum] opinion . . . give
color to the interpretation put on it by the Court of Appeals.” Id. at 661. A fair
reading of Slocum shows Redman’s acknowledgment to be a decided understatement. Commentators justifiably have understood Redman as having effectively reversed Slocum. See, e.g., Sward, supra note 140, at 613–24 (“contrast[ing]” Redman and Slocum and showing that Redman was not supported
by other cases the opinion had relied upon); Thomas, supra note 138, at 168–
73 (concluding that Redman was a “drastic change” from Slocum).
168. With respect to Galloway, three dissenting Justices carefully reviewed
the documentary and testimonial evidence that had been adduced at trial and
convincingly demonstrated that the majority in the case, as well as the trial
judge, had “weigh[ed] conflicting evidence” and made credibility assessments.
See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 397 (Black, J., dissenting). In doing so, the Court
upheld a directed verdict against a veteran who had sued for benefits due under a war risk insurance policy. The veteran had the burden of proving “total
and permanent” disability no later than May 31, 1919. Id. at 383–84 (majority
opinion). The veteran’s guardian introduced testimony from a doctor who had
diagnosed the veteran as suffering from a form of dementia that had been
triggered by the shock of conflict on the battle field before 1919. Id. at 408
(Black, J., dissenting). The veteran also had offered the testimony of two fellow soldiers, a friend who had known him both before and after the war, and
his commanding officer, all of whom testified to behaviors that were consistent
with the symptoms of insanity that the testifying doctor had identified. Id. at
408–12. Reviewing this testimony in detail, three Justices reasonably concluded in dissent that the majority of the Court “re-examine[d] testimony offered in a common law suit [and] weigh[ed] conflicting evidence.” Id. at 397;
see also Sward, supra note 140, at 603 (“The issue in Galloway could not be
classified as anything other than a question of fact: was Galloway permanently and totally disabled by reason of mental illness as of May 31, 1919, or
not?”). Simply put, the majority’s assertion that they gave “full credence to all
of the testimony” is not credible. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 396.
By the time Redman came before the Supreme Court, “four judges had
considered the sufficiency of the evidence, with two believing that the evidence
was sufficient, and two believing that it was not.” Sward, supra note 140, at
616. This alone strongly suggests that the judges’ determination that the evidence was insufficient was itself based on judicial fact-finding, a conclusion
confirmed by a fair review of the record. Id.
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important summary judgment procedure. Federal courts deciding motions for summary judgment must determine if there is a
“genuine issue as to any material fact”169 by asking whether “a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”170 Under these standards, federal judges now “decide[]
whether factual inferences from the evidence are reasonable,”
with the result that “[c]ases that would have been decided by a
jury under the common law are now dismissed by a judge under
summary judgment.”171 To date, however, the Court has not
been willing to acknowledge the degree to which federal courts
now possess the fact-finding powers that used to belong solely
to juries.
To be clear, the cases explored above did not displace the
jury’s fact-finding powers and replace one exclusivist regime
with another. Rather, these decisions created a regime in which
judges also had fact-finding powers. The contemporary result is
a regime of concurrence in which judges and juries both have
fact-finding powers: juries still find facts and return verdicts,
but judges also exercise fact-finding powers when they issue directed verdicts, judgments as a matter of law, and summary
judgments.
2. Juries and Non-Article III Adjudicatory Tribunals
Juries today share adjudicatory fact-finding power not only
with Article III judges, but with yet another governmental institution: judges on non-Article III tribunals. Administrative
agencies are the most important of these non-Article III tribunals. The rule today, as stated in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, is that “when
Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign
their adjudication to an administrative agency” whose nonArticle III administrative judge has the power to find facts.172
Further, “[t]his is the case even if the Seventh Amendment
would have required a jury [were] the adjudication of those
rights [to be] assigned instead to a federal court.”173 In other
169. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).
170. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
171. Thomas, supra note 138, at 143.
172. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977).
173. Id. Independent of the Seventh Amendment question of whether administrative judges rather than juries can find facts is the question of whether
adjudicatory facts can be found by non-Article III courts. This second inquiry
is variously conceptualized as either a due process or an Article III question.
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words, as regards public rights, the Supreme Court has forthrightly acknowledged that administrative agencies and juries
have concurrent authority to fact-find. This amounts to a significant degree of concurrent fact-finding authority because, as
Professor Monaghan recently reminded us, “[t]he ‘public rights’
exception is a wide and significant one” that “has been significantly enlarged so as to absorb much of what hitherto had fallen into the private rights domain.”174
As with the trajectory from exclusivity to concurrence detailed above in other doctrinal contexts, the Supreme Court has
not always acknowledged this concurrent regime. To the contrary, during most of our country’s history, the Court has understood the Constitution’s allocation of adjudicatory factfinding authority in exclusivist terms. Cases from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries regularly asserted that
federal lawsuits brought by the federal government for civil penalties in violation of federal statutes—in other words, lawsuits
premised on what today would be called “public rights”—
qualified as suits at common law that accordingly entitled the
defendant to a fact-finding jury under the Seventh Amendment.175
The first case upholding a statute that transferred adjudication from trial courts to a jury-free administrative agency did
so on the grounds that there existed an “exigency” on account of
the First World War, which justified the “suspension of [the]
ordinary remedies” of trial by jury.176 The “publicly notorious . . . emergency” consisted of inadequate rental properties
in the District of Columbia, which meant that there were not
adequate accommodations for federal employees.177 An Act of
Congress addressed the problem by permitting tenants to reMost federal legislative schemes provide that agency facts are reviewable by
federal courts—sometimes district courts, sometimes only courts of appeals—
under a substantial-evidence test. Id. at 455 & n.13. This has repeatedly been
held constitutional. Id. at 456. The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether Congress could “commit the adjudication of public rights and the imposition
of fines for their violation to an administrative agency without any sort of intervention by a court at any stage of the proceedings.” Id. at 455 n.13.
174. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 868, 873.
175. See, e.g., Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (stating
that the defendant was “entitled to have a jury summoned” in an action of
debt brought by the United States to recover a penalty under federal statute
regulating the immigration of aliens); see also United States v. Regan, 232
U.S. 37, 47 (1914) (same).
176. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156, 158 (1921).
177. Id. at 154.
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main in possession at the same rent they had been paying so
long as the rent paid was “reasonable” in the determination of a
housing commission established by the act.178
The bulk of Justice Holmes’s opinion in the Block v. Hirsh
decision did not address the Seventh Amendment, but instead
considered whether the rent control statute violated the Due
Process, Takings, and Contracts Clauses.179 Only after concluding that “a public exigency will justify the legislature in restricting property rights in land to a certain extent without
compensation” did the Court, in its final paragraph, address
the Seventh Amendment.180 It cursorily concluded:
If the power of the Commission established by the statute to regulate
the relation is established, as we think it is, by what we have said,
this objection [based on the Seventh Amendment] amounts to little.
To regulate the relation and to decide the facts affecting it are hardly
separable.181

In other words, so long as constitutional limitations apart from
the Seventh Amendment did not render the statute’s substantive provisions unconstitutional, the Seventh Amendment was
not violated either. To this not very self-evident proposition182
Holmes added two more brief justifications. The very emergency justifying the act’s substantive provisions equally excuses
the summary procedures because “[a] part of the exigency is to
secure a speedy and summary administration of the law.”183 In
any event, concluded Holmes, not much jury fact-finding was
displaced because “[w]hile the act is in force there is little to decide except whether the rent allowed is reasonable.”184
178. Id. at 154 –57.
179. See id. at 153–57.
180. Id. at 156, 158.
181. Id. at 158.
182. Holmes’s proposition here is not self-evident because the Seventh
Amendment is a constitutional limitation that is independent of the Due
Process Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Contracts Clause. Accordingly,
the mere fact that a statute does not violate these other clauses does not mean
that it could not violate the Seventh Amendment for it is elementary that a set
of facts might violate one doctrine but not another. For a similar argument,
see Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1041–42, 1099–1105 (1999) (describing the Seventh Amendment as an “independent constitutional right”).
183. Block, 256 U.S. at 158.
184. Id. In fact, however, questions about whether the rent was “reasonable” also could arise under the Act. Because the Act provided that the owner
shall have possession following thirty days notice “‘for actual and bona fide occupancy by himself, or his wife, children or dependents,’” the question could
arise as to whether an owner seeking to displace a tenant on this ground indeed was going to occupy the residence. Id. at 154. Indeed, the owner in the
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In short, the Block decision upheld what it deemed to be
only a limited incursion by an administrative agency into the
jury’s fact-finding domain, and did so on the narrow ground of
necessity to remedy a national emergency. A corollary was that
a citizen’s “ordinary remedies” included the right to have a jury
decide the issues that were being decided by the administrative
agency.185
The next two Supreme Court decisions upholding administrative agencies’ fact-finding powers did so with rationales fully
consistent with exclusivity. The 1937 case of NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.,186 best known for its Commerce Clause
holding, also decided that the National Labor Relations Board’s
power to decide whether an unfair labor practice had been
committed and to order backpay did not violate the Seventh
Amendment. The Court reasoned that the NLRB’s power did
not trench at all on the jury’s role guarded by the Seventh
Amendment because “[t]he instant case is not a suit at common
law or in the nature of such a suit. The proceeding is one unknown to the common law. It is a statutory proceeding.”187 Because the Seventh Amendment by its terms applies only to
“Suits at common law,” and because the NLRB adjudicated a
statutory proceeding rather than a suit at common law, the
Court reasoned that the NLRB was performing functions to
which the Seventh Amendment did not apply.188
The Court was still relying on the same exclusivity-friendly
rationale in the 1960s. Katchen v. Landy189 upheld the power of
a bankruptcy court, sitting without a jury, to adjudicate issues
that would have been entitled to a jury trial if the trustee had
pressed the issues in a separate lawsuit in federal court.190 The
Block case had alleged that he wanted the premises for his own use and the
tenant had denied this. Id. at 156.
185. Id. at 158.
186. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
187. Id. at 48–49.
188. Id. The NLRB Court provided a second rationale that also was consistent with exclusivity. The Seventh Amendment’s application to cases at common law long had been understood to mean that Seventh Amendment rights
did not attach to cases in equity, and the NLRB Court ruled that the case
brought by the NLRB was analogous to a case in equity rather than law. Id.
The Court further held that any monetary relief via orders of backpay were
merely “incident[al] to [nonlegal relief ] even though damages might have been
recovered in an action at law.” Id. at 48.
189. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
190. Id. at 336 (holding that bankruptcy judges can decide voidable preferences without a jury).
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Court reasoned that what would have been a legal claim if pursued on its own in an Article III federal court is “convert[ed]”
into an equitable claim when it arises “as part of the process of
allowance and disallowance of claims” in bankruptcy.191 Because the Seventh Amendment does not attach to equitable
proceedings—its reference to “Suits at common law” long has
been understood to mean that the Seventh Amendment applies
to suits in law but not in equity192—the Seventh Amendment
did not allocate power to the jury to hear voidable preference
claims raised in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.193 This
reasoning is consistent with exclusivity because, as in Jones &
Laughlin Steel, the Court’s rationale meant that the Seventh
Amendment did not apply at all to the bankruptcy judge’s activities.
Two cases in 1974 radically shifted the rationale for agencies’ powers to engage in adjudicatory fact-finding and, in the
process, created an explicit regime of concurrence. The question
in Curtis v. Loether was whether the Seventh Amendment entitled litigants to a jury trial in actions for damages under the
Civil Rights Act’s fair housing provisions.194 According to the
logic of Jones & Laughlin Steel the answer should have been
“no” because the housing right at issue in Curtis was “unknown
to the common law” and instead was “a statutory proceeding.”195 In finding that litigants were entitled to a jury, Curtis
wholly reconceptualized Jones & Laughlin Steel, asserting that
the case “merely stands for the proposition that the Seventh
Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the
whole concept of administrative adjudication and would substantially interfere with the NLRB’s role in the statutory
scheme.”196
Three aspects of Curtis merit notice. First, whereas Jones
& Laughlin justified its conclusion on the nature of the legal
right at issue (that the legal right was statutory rather than
common law-based), Curtis’s holding instead turned on where
the litigation occurred (a jury-free administrative proceeding

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446–47 (1830).
Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336–38.
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 190 (1974).
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1936).
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194.
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rather than a federal court).197 Second, this shift created a regime of concurrence: under Curtis’s approach, the identical legal right could be decided by either a jury-free administrative
agency or a court with a jury. Third, Curtis justified administrative agencies’ adjudicatory powers on the basis of naked
pragmatism: the Seventh Amendment is “generally inapplicable to administrative proceedings” because “jury trials would be
incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication.”198
The same three elements are on display in the 1974 case of
Pernell v. Southall Realty.199 Like the Curtis decision, Pernell
rerationalized an earlier decision—this time Block v. Hirsh—
that had cabined the extent to which agencies could invade the
jury’s turf.200 Whereas Block had upheld the agency’s jury-free
adjudicatory powers on the ground that exigent circumstances
justified an exception to a litigant’s “ordinary remedies,”201
Pernell recharacterized Block as standing for a business-asusual principle, stating that the case “merely stands for the
principle that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings.”202 As in Curtis, the Seventh
Amendment’s inapplicability was justified purely on practical
grounds.203 Finally, Pernell explicitly acknowledged the regime
of concurrence it had created. Pernell ruled that the Seventh
Amendment required a jury to adjudicate the right to possession of real property at issue in the case because the adjudication took place in an ordinary federal court.204 The Court went
on to observe that “[w]e may assume that the Seventh Amendment would not be a bar to a congressional effort to entrust
landlord-tenant disputes, including those over the right to possession, to an administrative agency.”205
The Pernell decision thus expressly acknowledges that the
identical dispute could be resolved either by a jury before a
court or a jury-free administrative agency. Concurrence was
197. See id. at 195.
198. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
199. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
200. See id. at 382–83.
201. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921).
202. Pernell, 416 U.S. at 383.
203. See id. (“[J]ury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of
administrative adjudication.”).
204. See id. at 383.
205. Id.; see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977) (affirming this rule).
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fully acknowledged. As this subpart’s tour through the case law
shows, though, such a forthright acknowledgment was a long
time coming.
C. ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION OF ARTICLE III AND NONARTICLE III COURTS
Article III’s language that the “judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish”206 could readily be interpreted to mean that federal
judicial power only can be vested in Article III courts207—in
other words, in an exclusivist manner.
And exclusivity indeed is the first approach that was taken. Consider in this regard the circuit court opinion in United
States v. More.208 An 1801 federal statute allowed justices of
the peace for the District of Columbia to collect fees from litigants for the judicial services they performed.209 Though this
provision was repealed a year later, justice of the peace Benjamin More continued to collect fees.210 When More was indicted,
he contended that the 1802 repeal was a reduction in compensation in violation of Article III, Section 1.211 The Circuit Court
of the District of Columbia agreed. Dismissing the indictment,
the court said:
It is difficult to conceive how a magistrate can lawfully sit in
judgment, exercising judicial powers, and enforcing his judgments by
process of law, without holding a court. I consider such a court, thus
exercising a part of the judicial power of the United States, as an inferior court, and the justice of the peace as the judge of that court.212
206. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
207. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 859
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“On its face, Article III, § 1, seems to prohibit
the vesting of any judicial functions in either the Legislative or the Executive
Branch.”); Nelson, supra note 55, at 565 (arguing that Article III “strongly implies that neither Congress nor entities within the executive branch can exercise” judicial authority); cf. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 868 (“Article III
might (at least as an original matter) have been understood to require that if
any adjudication by federal tribunals occurs, it must occur in Article III
courts.”).
208. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805). The More case was brought to my attention by an intriguing article by Professor Gary Lawson. See Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV. 853, 878–
86 (1990) (discussing Article III and territorial judges).
209. See Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 11, 2 Stat. 103, 107.
210. See More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 159.
211. See id. at 165–66.
212. Id. at 161 n.*.
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The circuit court’s holding was predicated on an unspoken
assumption of exclusivity. Having decided that the justice of
the peace served on a federally created court that acted judicially, the circuit court automatically concluded that the District of Columbia’s court was an Article III tribunal that accordingly
enjoyed
protection
against
diminishment
of
compensation.213 Without the assumption of exclusivity, the
fact that the justice of the peace served on a federal court exercising judicial power would not automatically have meant that
it was an Article III federal court.214
But exclusivity did not hold for long. As Professor Monaghan has written, “[t]he expanding national government and the
rapidly expanding national domain quickly rendered any such
conception untenable. From the very beginning, the Court recognized ‘exceptions,’ i.e., that significant federal adjudication
could occur in non-Article III tribunals.”215
Same-effect concurrence was first adopted in the 1828 decision of American Insurance Co. v. Canter.216 The case concerned a ship carrying a large quantity of cotton that had been
lost off the coast of the territory of Florida.217 A portion of the
cotton had been saved by rescue ships, and the issue was
whether a federally created territorial court was competent to
adjudicate salvage cases.218 Canter acknowledged that salvage
213. Id.; see also O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933)
(holding that judges of the District of Columbia’s Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals are constitutionally protected from having their compensation reduced).
214. Incontrovertible evidence of this proposition is that the United States
Supreme Court reasoned in just this fashion 170 years after More was decided,
ruling that Congress had the power to create a non-Article III court known as
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, which could try criminal cases
for violations of federal law but that the court’s judges enjoyed neither life tenure nor salary protection since they did not sit on an Article III court. See
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 390 (1973). Gary Lawson also has
pointed out this relationship between the More and Palmore decisions. See
Lawson, supra note 208, at 893.
215. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 868; see also Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III,
65 IND. L.J. 233, 241–42 (1990) (“[A]rticle I courts and the article III courts
frequently exercise a concurrent jurisdiction or otherwise share portions of the
judicial business.”).
216. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
217. See id. at 513.
218. The court that heard the salvage claim was created by the Florida territorial legislature pursuant to a federal statute, which had empowered the
legislature to do so. See Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 532. Though the petitioner
argued that “Congress cannot vest admiralty jurisdiction in Courts created by
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fell within the admiralty jurisdiction that itself is part of what
Article III calls the “judicial Power of the United States.” Yet
the judges on the territorial courts held “their offices for four
years,” not the life tenure guaranteed by Article III.219 Canter
held that although the territorial courts were not Article III
“constitutional Courts,” they nonetheless had jurisdiction to
hear salvage claims.220
In upholding concurrent adjudicatory powers as between
Article III federal courts and non-Article III territorial courts,
Canter accepted same-effect concurrence. In doing so, Chief
Justice Marshall vociferously rejected same-source concurrence, explaining that:
[The territorial courts were] not constitutional Courts, in which the
judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it . . . . The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial
power which is defined in the 3d Article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which
that body possesses over the territories of the United States.221

Two observations are in order. First, Canter is an early example of the rejection of a strong form of expressio unius est exclusio alterius: that Article III vests federal judicial power in
“constitutional Courts” did not preclude Congress from conferring adjudicatory jurisdiction in other entities. Second, Canter’s
reasoning depended on a strong distinction between same-effect
and same-source concurrence. The Court proclaimed that Florida salvage courts could do what they did, despite their being
run by judges without life tenure, only because their judicial
powers did not qualify as part of the “judicial Power of the
United States.”222
the territorial legislature,” the Court quite reasonably collapsed the distinction
between delegator and delegate and instead analyzed the issue as if Congress
itself had directly created the salvage court in question. See id. at 546. Professor Lawson treats Canter’s discussion as mere dictum because the salvage
court had been created by the territorial legislature rather than by Congress.
See Lawson, supra note 208, at 888, 892. But he offers no reason for believing
that the delegate (the territorial legislature) should have more power to create
a non-Article III court than the delegator (Congress). In any event, as Lawson
himself notes, subsequent Supreme Court decisions treated Canter’s discussion as a holding, not dicta. See id. at 892.
219. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 512.
220. Id. at 546.
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. To be clear, I mean simply to characterize Canter’s reasoning from the
internal perspective of its authors, not to praise it. Many have trenchantly critiqued Cantor for failing to explain why the federal territorial court’s exercise
of admiralty adjudication was not part of the “judicial Power of the United
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The other great opinions of the nineteenth century upholding non-Article III federal tribunals likewise justified their
holdings on the distinction between same-effect concurrence,
which they tolerated, and same-source concurrence, which they
did not. Consider the important case of Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.223 Samuel Swartwout was a
federal collector of customs for the port of New York.224 Pursuant to an 1820 statute, the Treasury Department conducted
an internal audit and determined that Swartwout had collected
almost $1.4 million more than he had remitted to the government.225 Under authority of the statute, the solicitor of the
treasury issued a “distress warrant” that directed a federal
marshal to levy against and thereafter sell certain of Swartwout’s real property to satisfy his debt.226
It was argued in Murray’s Lessee that the marshal’s sale of
Swartwout’s property was unconstitutional because the Treasury officials’ acts (auditing Swartwout’s account, ascertaining
its balance, and issuing the distress warrant) constituted the
exercise of United States judicial power that only could have
been undertaken by an Article III court.227 In upholding the
Treasury officials’ acts, Murray’s Lessee famously announced
what has become known as the “public rights” doctrine.228 In
the Court’s own words:
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented
in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and
which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress
may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.229
States.” See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 22, at 36–39 (“[S]upporting policy and
constitutional arguments [for the status of territorial courts] are far from settled.”); Bator, supra note 215, at 241–42 (contending that Justice Marshall
“invent[ed]” the position of territorial courts as non-Article III, “legislative
Courts”); Lawson, supra note 208, at 887–93 (“[T]he Court made no attempt to
reconcile this dictum with its prior, and at least arguably inconsistent, case
law . . . .”). Below I discuss Justice Harlan’s rerationalization of this part of
Canter’s rationale. See infra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
223. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
224. Id. at 275.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 274.
227. Id. at 275.
228. See Monaghan, supra note 26, at 871 (noting that Murray’s Lessee
“still remains the fountainhead for the modern public rights doctrine”); Nelson, supra note 55, at 586–90 (discussing Murray’s Lessee and the special exception for tax collection).
229. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
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The “public rights” doctrine is an example of concurrence insofar as such rights may be adjudicated in Article III tribunals or
Article I tribunals. Like Canter, Murray’s Lessee relied on a
strong distinction between same-effect and same-source concurrence. The Court upheld the challenged arrangement on the
ground that the Article I official was not acting judicially and,
conversely, “admitted” that “if the auditing of [Swartout’s] account, and the ascertainment of its balance, and the issuing of
this process, was an exercise of the judicial power of the United
States, the proceeding was void; for the officers who performed
these acts could exercise no part of that judicial power.”230 The
treasury officials’ acts were constitutional only because the subject-matter was not “necessarily . . . a judicial controversy”231
despite the fact that it was something over “which the judicial
power c[ould] be exerted.”232
Though Canter and Murray’s Lessee both embraced sameeffect concurrence, the two decisions also suggested a discomfort with concurrence. Consider Chief Justice Marshall’s adamant yet unjustified insistence that territorial courts’ adjudicatory powers were not part of Article III’s judicial power, and
Murray’s Lessee’s resolve that the Article I official was not acting judicially. By contrast, the Court’s comfort with concurrence grew immeasurably in the twentieth century. This can be
seen in Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court in Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok,233 where Harlan reworked Chief Justice Marshall’s
reasoning in the Canter decision. Glidden acknowledged Chief
Justice Marshall’s averment that territorial courts were not
courts “in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution . . . can be deposited” and were “incapable of receiving” the
judicial power of which the Constitution spoke,234 but Justice
Harlan went on to state that “[f]ar from being ‘incapable of receiving’ federal-question jurisdiction, the territorial courts have
long exercised a jurisdiction commensurate in this regard with
that of the regular federal courts.”235
230. Id. at 275.
231. Id. at 281.
232. Id.
233. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
234. Id. at 544 (quoting Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546
(1828)).
235. Id. at 545 n.13 (emphasis added). Though Harlan labored to show that
his and Marshall’s words in Canter were consistent—“[a]ll the Chief Justice
meant . . . is that in the territories cases and controversies falling within the
enumeration of Article III may be heard and decided in courts constituted
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By the end of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
had become fully at ease with concurrence. This is most clearly
seen in the decision of Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.236 Going the final step beyond Glidden’s talk of
“commensurate” power, Schor observed that Congress could
“authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a nonArticle III tribunal.”237 Though the counterclaim at issue in the
case was a “‘private’ right for which state law provide[d] the
rule of decision,” and which accordingly was “a claim of the
kind assumed to be at the ‘core’ of matters normally reserved to
Article III courts,”238 Schor rejected the view that “bright-line
rules” confined such claims to Article III courts239 and upheld
the non-Article III court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Surely Professor Monaghan is correct when he speaks of today’s “system
of shared adjudication between agencies and Article III
courts”240 and, in so doing, Monaghan provides a full-throated
recognition of concurrence.
D. LEGISLATIVE POWER: CONGRESS AND AGENCIES
Early Supreme Court decisions and early treatises understood Article I, Section 1’s declaration that “[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress” in exclusivist terms: that only Congress may legislate.241 The threat to
congressional exclusivity in the early days came in the form of
apparent congressional delegations of legislative power to other
governmental institutions.242 The response to such actions was
without regard to the limitations of that article,” id. at 544 –45—surely Harlan’s words reflect a greater comfort with concurrence.
236. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Justice Brennan also acknowledged
nonexclusivity while advancing a very different approach to understanding
non-Article III courts. Justice Brennan later explained that although “Article
III, § 1, seems to prohibit the vesting of any judicial functions in either the
Legislative or the Executive Branch . . . [t]he Court has, however, recognized
three narrow exceptions to the otherwise absolute mandate of Article III.”
Schor, 478 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
237. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
238. Id. at 853.
239. Id. at 857.
240. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 873 (emphasis added).
241. Merrill, supra note 50, at 2098 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1) (emphasis added).
242. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV.
327, 353–72 (2002) (describing early cases involving delegation of legislative
power).
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unequivocal.243 With respect to congressional delegations to the
executive branch, the 1892 decision of Marshall Field & Co. v.
Clark asserted “[t]hat congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital
to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution.”244 Addressing legislative delegations to courts, Chief Justice Marshall stated in Wayman v.
Southard that “[i]t will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are
strictly and exclusively legislative.”245 Speaking more generally, Thomas Cooley’s nineteenth-century treatise declares that
“[o]ne of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the
power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority.”246
Virtually everyone today acknowledges, however, that
these nineteenth-century statements of congressional exclusivity do not describe contemporary American government.247 A
significant amount of lawmaking today occurs in the extracongressional governmental entities known as administrative
agencies.248
243. See id. Perhaps this was only rhetorical: in none of the early cases did
the Court strike down a federal statute on nondelegation grounds. See Merrill,
supra note 50, at 2103 (explaining that early cases did not result in invalidation of a statute).
244. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
245. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825). Chief Justice
Marshall’s formulation here concededly is ambiguous as to whether legislative
power can be delegated: it might be thought that he meant to say that powers
that are “strictly and exclusively legislative” cannot be delegated, but that
matters that are legislative in character but not “exclusively legislative” may
be delegated. When read in context, however, it is clear that the Chief Justice
meant to contrast “strictly and exclusively legislative” with matters that are
non-legislative yet still may be undertaken by the Congress, not with matters
that are legislative and yet delegable. See id. at 43 (stating that “Congress
may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully
exercise itself ” and using the example of congressional delegation to courts of
functions associated with the judicial process); see Lawson, supra note 242, at
358–59 (reaching a similar conclusion).
246. THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 224 (8th ed. 1927).
247. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 40–46 (1985) (discussing delegation to courts);
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 57, at 1762 (“Delegation of powers
is . . . common in public and private life . . . .”).
248. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 50, at 2099 (“Congress has massively delegated legislative rulemaking authority to administrative agencies.”); Posner
& Vermeule, supra note 57, at 1745–53 (justifying delegation to agencies);
Sunstein, supra note 77, at 315 (“[T]he United States Code has become littered
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As a formal doctrinal matter, though, contemporary constitutional doctrine has not been willing to part with the myth of
exclusivity. The nondelegation doctrine still purports to absolutely prohibit the delegation of legislative power.249 A recent
nondelegation decision, Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.,250 is representative of contemporary doctrine251
when it asserts that “[i]n a delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative
power to the agency. Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution
vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress
of the United States.’ This text permits no delegation of those
powers.”252
How can this exclusivist rationale be harmonized with the
contemporary reality of widespread rulemaking by agencies?
There is a simple formal answer: the Court has equated legislative power with discretion and has concluded that no legislative
power is delegated so long as Congress provides an “intelligible
principle” that cabins the administrative agency’s discretion.253
with provisions asking one or another administrative agency to do whatever it
thinks best.”).
249. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 2119 (“[T]he sharing of the legislative
power is not permitted . . . .”).
250. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
251. Earlier case law formulated the constraint on Congress’s ability to
delegate differently. Chief Justice Marshall stated that there is some inexact
“line . . . which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general
provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such
general provisions to fill up the details.” Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825). Today’s “intelligible principle” formulation originated in
the 1928 decision of J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
409 (1935). Scholars debate to what degree Hampton’s formulation
represented a change in the doctrine. Compare Lawson, supra note 242, at
368–72 (arguing against the view that Hampton altered the doctrine announced by Chief Justice Marshall), with Posner & Vermeule, supra note 57,
at 1740 (“The critical passage from Wayman v. Southard, then, adopts a different theory than the one modern nondelegation proponents have read into
it.”).
252. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added). Other cases have reasoned similarly. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991)
(“Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another
branch of Government.”); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co.,
287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) (“That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course, clear.”); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 407 (explaining that Congress may not delegate lawmaking power).
253. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (stating that Congress may delegate “decisionmaking authority [to] agencies” as long as the legislative act includes some guiding “intelligible principle” (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co.,
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But the Court has applied this standard extraordinarily loosely.254 It has been deemed to be met by statutes that instruct
agencies to regulate on the basis of “public interest, convenience, or necessity,”255 to set “fair and equitable prices,”256 or to
set ambient air quality standards that are “requisite to protect
public health.”257 In fact, the Court struck down statutes on
nondelegation grounds on only two occasions—and both occurred in 1935 before (the first) Justice Roberts’s famous
“switch in time.”258 Cass Sunstein puts it nicely when he says
that “it is more accurate, speaking purely descriptively, to see
1935 as the real anomaly. We might say that the conventional
[nondelegation] doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad
ones (and counting).”259
As a formal matter, defining legislative power as it has
permits the Court to continue to assert that no legislative power has been delegated. As a pragmatic matter, however, by construing the nondelegation doctrine’s “intelligible principle” so
broadly, the Court has sanctioned a regime of concurrence under which more than one governmental entity—Congress and
agencies—exercise de facto legislative power. This is what has
led Justices Stevens and Souter to criticize the Court for “pretend[ing] . . . that the authority delegated” to administrative
agencies “is somehow not ‘legislative power’,” advocating instead that “it would be both wiser and more faithful to what we
have actually done in delegation cases to admit that agency

276 U.S. at 409)); Merrill, supra note 50, at 2119 (explaining that the Supreme
Court’s current version of the nondelegation doctrine uses “the discretionary
meaning of ‘legislative power’”).
254. For example, Thomas Merrill recently has argued that “legislative
power” entails “the power to make rules for the governance of society,” Merrill,
supra note 50, at 2115, that administrative agencies exercise precisely this
power today, and that they properly do so as long as Congress explicitly delegates them this power. Id. at 2120. Gary Lawson describes the status quo as
one where the Court has found the intelligible principle standard to be satisfied by “any collection of words that Congress chose to string together.” Lawson, supra note 242, at 371. Other scholars who have noted that the nondelegation doctrine fails to curb delegations of de facto lawmaking authority to
agencies include David Schoenbrod and Martin Redish. See generally REDISH,
supra note 22; DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
255. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943).
256. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427 (1944).
257. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473.
258. Sunstein, supra note 77, at 318.
259. Id. at 322.
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rulemaking authority is ‘legislative power.’”260 To use this Article’s terminology, Justices Stevens and Souter have argued
that the federal legislative power today is concurrently exercised by Congress and administrative agencies.
Virtually the entire scholarly community concurs that Justices Stevens and Souter have the better of the argument as a
purely descriptive matter: it is widely agreed that the Court’s
expansive interpretation of “intelligible principle” means that
agencies exercise de facto legislative power.261 This raises an
interesting question: why does a majority of the Court continue
to cling to the exclusivist rationale that no legislative power
has been, nor can be, delegated? Precedent provides a large
part of the answer: as Justices Stevens and Souter acknowledge, the Court’s past opinions have uniformly asserted that
agencies do not make law but instead make something else262—
akin to the nineteenth-century cases explored in the previous
subpart that insisted that Article I courts do not exercise federal judicial power.263
But that only pushes back the question, for then it must be
asked why earlier Courts adopted the exclusivist assumption
that only Congress could exercise legislative power. Answering
this question is complicated by the fact that early Congresses
enacted statutes that are naturally understood as having delegated lawmaking power to the executive and judicial
branches:264 one “statute provid[ed] for military pensions ‘under
such regulations as the President of the United States may direct,’”265 another authorized members of the executive branch
“to license ‘any proper person[]’ to trade with Indian tribes ‘[by]
such rules and regulations as the President [shall] pre-

260. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
261. See supra note 254. The consensus breaks down with respect to what,
if anything, should be done about this. Compare Merrill, supra note 50, at
2158, 2165 (arguing that delegation is preferable to nondelegation and advocating for rejection of the nondelegation doctrine), with SCHOENBROD, supra
note 254, at 155–80 (arguing that the court should bar delegation).
262. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (acknowledging that “there is
language in our opinions that supports the Court’s articulation of our holding”
and citing to a raft of such cases).
263. See supra Part II.C.
264. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 57, at 1735–36 (setting forth a list
of such statutes).
265. Id. at 1735 (quoting Act of September 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95, 95).
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scribe,’”266 and yet another “authorized the courts to ‘make and
establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting of business in the [federal] courts.’”267 Congress delegated portions of
its nonlegislative powers as well. For instance, although the
Constitution grants Congress the power to call forth the state
militias,268 the Militia Act of 1792 granted the President the
power to activate militias “whenever the United States shall be
invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign
nation or Indian tribe.”269
In short, the early Supreme Court decisions’ assertions
that Congress’s powers could not be delegated flew in the face
of contrary contemporary practice.270 What then explains the
Court’s insistence on exclusivity? The same question can be applied to the Court’s contemporary doctrine, which to this day
formally denies that legislative power can be delegated and asserts that only Congress can legislate. The best answer I can
muster is that the Court’s continual exclusivist rhetoric strongly evidences the ongoing power of exclusivist sensibilities.
Finally, to fully appreciate the degree to which institutions
apart from Congress exercise de facto legislative power we
must not confine our inquiry to administrative agencies. There
is yet another governmental institution outside of Congress
where significant lawmaking occurs: courts, particularly when
they interpret vague statutes that do not fall under the rulemaking aegis of an administrative agency.271 Federal antitrust
law is an excellent example, for almost the entirety of antitrust
law is the creation of courts.272 Copyright’s fair use doctrine is
another example.273
266. Id. (quoting Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, 137).
267. Id. (quoting Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 83).
268. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
269. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264, 264.
270. As shown above, this is also true of the Court’s early approaches to
non-Article III courts, supra Part II.C, and its early insistence that only juries
find facts, supra Part II.B.
271. This is typically, but not wholly, overlooked. Professors Martin Redish
and Gary Lawson are two exceptional scholars who have discussed these sorts
of delegations. See REDISH, supra note 22; Lawson, supra note 242.
272. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688 (1978) (explaining that the legislative history of the Sherman Act “makes
it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate”).
273. The 1976 copyright statute codified the common law fair use doctrine,
see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006), but used open-ended language that was not intended to “freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid
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In other words, when Congress enacts vague statutory language without delegating rulemaking authority to an executive
agency, courts in effect must generate the law as they decide
questions unresolved by Congress on a case-by-case basis—a
process that is variously called statutory interpretation or federal common law.274 Constitutional doctrine imposes virtually
no limits on this sort of congressional delegation. To begin, the
nondelegation doctrine does not apply at all. Though the voidfor-vagueness doctrine at one point was conceptualized, inter
alia, as an antidelegation separation of powers principle, today
courts almost exclusively treat void-for-vagueness as a due
process principle designed to provide notice and to ensure nonarbitrary enforcement.275 Further, as a practical matter, the
void-for-vagueness doctrine primarily has been applied to state
laws,276 and is limited almost exclusively to the criminal and
First Amendment contexts.277
technological change.” H.R. REP. NO. 94 -1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680. For a full discussion, see Edward Lee, Technological
Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
274. See Rosen, supra note 115, at 804 –05 (describing statutory interpretation and the creation of federal common law in the context of preemption).
275. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (“A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First, if it fails to
provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand
what conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.”). Some earlier void-for-vagueness cases conceptualized the doctrine as ameliorating legislative delegations of authority to
courts and juries. See, e.g., United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 523–24
(1942) (holding that the statute was “not vague nor does it delegate policymaking powers to either court or jury”); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445,
457 (1927) (voiding a statute because it impermissibly “submit[ted] to the
jury” an issue that is “legislative, not judicial”). However, this antidelegation
rationale has “largely been abandoned in favor of . . . preventing arbitrary and
discriminatory law enforcement.” Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-forVagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279,
282 (2003). One modern Supreme Court decision has revived the nondelegation concept, but assimilated it under the concern of arbitrary enforcement.
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (“A vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application.”). No recent case has relied on the
delegation concept as a basis for finding a law to be void for vagueness.
276. An influential student Note written by now-Professor Amsterdam both
noted this and proffered an explanation as to why the void-for-vagueness doctrine primarily limited states rather than the federal government. See Note,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67,
82–85 (1960). A recent article confirms that this trend has continued. See
Goldsmith, supra note 275, at 290.
277. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
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In short, Congress’s legislative power frequently is shared
with administrative agencies and courts.
E. THE TREATY POWER
Professors Ackerman and Golove have shown that Congress and Presidents originally believed that some international agreements only could be created by treaty, and that it was
only in the mid-twentieth century that Congress and Presidents came to believe that treaties and congressional-executive
agreements were wholly “interchangeable;” in other words, that
the Senate’s treaty powers and Congress’s ordinary legislative
powers are wholly (or virtually wholly) concurrent.278 As shown
earlier, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States takes the position that “any agreement concluded as a congressional-executive agreement could also be
concluded by treaty” and states that “[t]he prevailing view is
that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an
alternative to the treaty method in every instance.”279
F. HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM: STATES’ REGULATORY
JURISDICTION
The trajectory from exclusivity to concurrence also is
present in the “horizontal federalism” context with respect to
the scope of states’ regulatory powers. The early approach, expressed by Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of
Laws, was a strictly territorialist conception of state power that
gave rise to exclusivity. Justice Story averred that “the laws of
every state affect and bind directly all property . . . within its
territory []. . . and all persons who are resident within it” and
“no state . . . can, by its laws, directly affect or bind property
out of its own territory, or bind persons not resident therein.”280
On this approach, states had absolutely no power to regulate
extraterritorially. Because each state’s power extended to its
physical borders, and no further, each state’s regulatory powers
were nonoverlapping and hence exclusive.
U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (“[P]erhaps the most important factor affecting the clarity
that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.”).
278. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 861–96 (discussing how the
doctrine of interchangeability came to be adopted).
279. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e (1986).
280. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 18, 20
(2d ed. 1841).
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Early Supreme Court cases adopted similar exclusivist
rhetoric. An 1881 decision declared that “[n]o State can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction,” meaning
within its own physical borders, and that “[e]ach State is independent of all the others in this particular.”281 An opinion eleven years later asserted that “[l]aws have no force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts
them.”282 A 1914 decision stated that “it would be impossible to
permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State . . . without throwing down the constitutional
barriers by which all the States are restricted within the orbits
of their lawful authority.”283 In all these cases, the Court used
the term “jurisdiction” interchangeably with “physical borders.”
This exclusivist approach to state regulatory powers, however, never squared with actual practice. States early-on applied their laws to persons, transactions, and occurrences that
laid beyond their physical borders. For example, in 1819 the
General Court of Virginia held that a Virginia statute which
criminalized “all felonies committed by citizen against citizen,
in any such place” supported the Virginia Attorney General’s
prosecution of a Virginia citizen for having stolen a fellow Virginian’s horse in the District of Columbia.284 Consider as well a
nineteenth-century Texas law that provided that “[p]ersons out
of the State may commit, and be liable to indictment and conviction for committing, any of the offenses enumerated in this
chapter, which do not in their commission necessarily require a
personal presence in this State.”285 Interpreting this law, an
1882 Texas decision upheld the application of Texas’s criminal
law to an act of forgery of a land certificate for Texas property
281. Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881).
282. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892).
283. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914).
284. See Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172, 174 (1819). Interestingly, the Virginia court’s decision contained an important choice-of-law
holding: what qualified as a “felony” was to be determined by Virginia law, not
the law of the place where the activity occurred. See id. at 181. The dissenters
in the case acknowledged that “it is competent for a State to legislate rules of
conduct for its citizens while resident beyond its territorial limits,” but did not
believe that the Virginia legislature had intended to create such an extraterritorial regulation. Id. at 183 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Virginia legislature
modified the statute in 1819 to make clear that they did not intend to extend
extraterritorial jurisdiction. See id. at 182 (“[T]he Legislature, in changing essentially the terms of this Law, have rendered it very plain in future cases.
They have made of it an entirely new Law.”).
285. 1879 Tex. Crim. Stat. 454 (emphasis added).
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even though all the criminal acts had occurred in Louisiana.286
The court further observed that Texas criminal law could be
applied even if the defendants’ acts were “no crime against the
State in which it [was] perpetrated.”287
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court formally recognized the power of states to regulate persons and things that
lay beyond their physical borders. In Strassheim v. Daily, the
Court permitted Michigan to prosecute a non-Michigander for
acts defrauding Michigan that were undertaken outside of
Michigan.288 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes wrote that
“[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the
effect.”289
Today’s restatements and model codes explicitly acknowledge states’ significant extraterritorial regulatory powers. The
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States provides that states within the United States “may apply at least some laws to a person outside [State] territory on
the basis that he is a citizen, resident, or domiciliary of the
State.”290 The Restatement further states that this extraterritoriality principle applies to both criminal and civil legislative
powers.291 Directed to the criminal context, the Model Penal
Code provides that State A may impose liability if “the offense
is based on a statute of this State that expressly prohibits conduct outside the State.”292 The Model Penal Code affirms that
State A has extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction even if the

286. Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 289, 305–09 (1882).
287. Id. at 309. For more examples, see Rosen, supra note 8, at 719–20.
288. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 281 (1911).
289. Id. at 285. Thirty years later, in Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69
(1941), the Court upheld the application of a Florida statute prohibiting
sponge fishing to a Florida citizen’s activities that occurred wholly outside of
Florida’s territorial waters. The Skiriotes Court analogized Florida’s extraterritorial regulatory powers to the unquestioned power of the federal government to regulate its citizens when they are “upon the high seas or even in foreign countries,” id. at 73, and adverted to Florida’s “status of a sovereign” as
the source of similar state extraterritorial powers. Id. at 77.
290. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402 reporters’ note 5 (1986).
291. See id. § 403 cmt. f (“The principles governing jurisdiction to prescribe
set forth in § 402 and in this section apply to criminal as well as to civil regulation.”).
292. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f ) (1962).
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activity it prohibits occurs in a State in which the activity is
permissible.293
The significant extent to which states can regulate extraterritorially means that more than one state’s laws frequently
can apply to a given person, transaction, or occurrence—
something that the Court explicitly acknowledged in 1981 when
it wrote that “a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in constitutional terms,
application of the law of more than one jurisdiction.”294 In the
context of horizontal federalism, then, early exclusivist assumptions also have given way to accepting that states frequently have concurrent regulatory authority.295
G. THE PARDON POWER
The Constitution gives the President the power to grant
pardons.296 The earliest Supreme Court opinions understood
this grant in exclusivist terms: “To the executive alone is intrusted the power of pardon.”297 On the basis of this understanding, the Court described a statute whose provisions purported to authorize the President to grant certain pardons and
amnesties as only a “suggestion of pardon by Congress, for such
it was, rather than authority.”298
Here, as elsewhere, exclusivity soon gave way to concurrence. At issue in Brown v. Walker was the constitutionality of
a statute that granted immunity from prosecution, penalty, or
forfeiture to persons who gave testimony or other evidence to
the Interstate Commerce Commission.299 The Court held that
“testimony,” under the statute, “operate[d] as a complete pardon for the offense to which it relates,” and understood the con293. See id. § 1.03(2).
294. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981).
295. To be clear, states do not enjoy plenary extraterritorial regulatory authority. For example, “Alabama does not have the power . . . to punish [a company] for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had no impact on
Alabama or its residents.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572–73
(1996). In fact, multiple constitutional principles constrain the scope of state
extraterritorial regulatory powers. See generally Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
855, 896–945 (2002). In this context of overlapping powers, as elsewhere, concurrency is not “all or nothing.” See infra Part IV.
296. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
297. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871) (emphasis
added).
298. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
299. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 591 (1896).
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stitutional question to be whether Congress had the power to
issue pardons.300 Upholding the statute, the Court held that
“[a]lthough the Constitution vests in the President ‘power to
grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United
States . . . ,’ this power has never been held to take from Congress the power to pass acts of general amnesty.”301 The Court
then equated amnesties with pardons, stating that “[t]he distinction between amnesty and pardon is of no practical importance. . . . [But] ‘is one rather of philological interest than of legal importance.’”302 Insofar as Congress enacted the immunity
statute pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, Brown accordingly upheld an instance of same-effect concurrence.303 Justice
Field’s dissent rejected the Court’s embrace of concurrence and
propounded an exclusivist rationale.304 The immunity statute
was unconstitutional, Justice Field thought, because “Congress
cannot grant a pardon. That is an act of grace which can only
be performed by the President.”305
H. CONTEXTUALIZING THE TRAJECTORY: THE REMAINING
IMPORTANCE OF EXCLUSIVITY AND SOME INSTANCES OF A
COUNTERTRAJECTORY
While there is a significant incidence of concurrence in
United States law, one should not lose sight of the fact that
many of the Constitution’s power allocations still are understood exclusively. Nobody to date has suggested that any institution apart from Congress has the power to raise and support
armies and appropriate monies for war,306 that institutions
apart from the Senate can try impeachments,307 or that institu300. Id. at 595.
301. Id. at 601 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 2).
302. Id. (citing Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152 (1877)).
303. See id. at 609–10. Though Brown rejected Klein’s exclusivist assumptions, the two cases are not necessarily incompatible. Brown addressed the
question of whether Congress has the power to grant pardons, whereas Klein
concerned the very different question of whether Congress could regulate so as
to affect the President’s exercise of his pardon power. See id. at 593–94; United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 136 (1871).
304. See Brown, 161 U.S. at 638 (Field, J., dissenting).
305. Id. (emphasis added).
306. Even here some concurrence-type questions have arisen. For instance:
do the President’s executive powers include the prerogative to elect not to
spend monies that have been allocated?
307. But see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (holding that
it is a political question whether only a subset of the Senate may hear testimony and submit proposed findings for a vote of the entire Senate).
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tions apart from the President can recognize foreign countries.308 In these contexts, there has been no trajectory from exclusivity to concurrence. Rather, exclusivist understandings
have endured, and indeed have been unchallenged.
On the other hand, the longevity of universally held exclusivist assumptions does not guarantee that they will forever
endure. Indeed, some of the most controversial proposals that
have been put forward by contemporary scholars amount to
suggestions that activities long thought to belong exclusively to
one institution actually are shared concurrently with others.
Consider in this regard Professor Bruce Ackerman’s argument
that there are mechanisms outside of Article V by which “the
People” can amend the Constitution, and Professor Michael
Ramsey’s thesis that the President can declare war.309 Whether
these particular proposals for new areas of concurrence gain
traction remains to be seen. But many academics embrace yet
another form of concurrence: the theory that the Supreme
Court effectuates extra-Article V amendments by means of creative constitutional interpretation.310
Finally, to fully understand the relation between exclusivist and concurrent power allocations in contemporary United
States constitutionalism, one must take account of those instances where there has been a countertrajectory from concurrence to exclusivity. There are not many such instances in contemporary constitutional law, but there are a few in the Court’s
vertical federalism jurisprudence.
The trajectory is complex. Early case law toyed with the
exclusivist prospect that regulatory powers held by Congress
necessarily were not also held by States.311 The Court soon
308. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 204 (1986) (“Under the Constitution of the United States,
the President has exclusive authority to recognize or not to recognize a foreign
state or government, and to maintain or not to maintain diplomatic relations
with a foreign government.”).
309. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 266–69; Ramsey, supra note 12, at
324.
310. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 13, at 1351; David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2001). This
is most plausibly conceptualized as a species of same-effect concurrence; Article III judicial power encompasses common law reasoning that has the power
to alter constitutional meaning for all intents and purposes. See Strauss, supra, at 1468.
311. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 200 (1824) (refusing to
answer whether state power to regulate commerce “is surrendered by the mere
grant to Congress, or is retained until Congress shall exercise the power. We
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opted for same-effect concurrence, ruling that the Constitution’s grant of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce did not deprive states of power to regulate interstate
commerce under their historic police powers.312 But exclusivity’s attractions had not been vanquished, for exclusivity played
a prominent role fifty years later in the Civil Rights Cases,
where the Court asserted that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment “does not invest Congress with power to legislate
upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation.”313 The grounding of this conclusion was the exclusivist
assumption that matters falling within the regulatory authority of states perforce cannot also lie within Congress’s regulatory authority.314 In later cases the Court understood Section 5 to
authorize Congress to regulate matters that the States also had
power to regulate,315 though the Civil Rights Cases’ doctrinal
limits that were justified on the basis of exclusivity remain
with us to this day.316
A different story pertains to the Commerce Clause where,
throughout most of the twentieth century, it was understood
that Congress could regulate things that the states could regulate under their historic police powers.317 But in the recent
may dismiss that inquiry, because it has been exercised . . . .”). In his concurring opinion, Justice Johnson was willing to decide the question squarely in
favor of exclusivity. See id. at 227 (Johnson, J., concurring) (“[T]he power [to
regulate commerce] must be exclusive; it can reside but in one potentate; and
hence, the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving nothing for the State to act upon.”).
312. See Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251–
52 (1829).
313. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (relying on this argument to
conclude that Congress was without the power to regulate private persons under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
314. See id. at 14 –15.
315. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1966) (holding
that Congress had the power under Section 5 to legislate regarding voting requirements, which states unquestionably also have the power to regulate).
316. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620–27 (2000) (reaffirming Civil Rights Cases’ holding that Congress’s Section 5 powers extend only to
state action, not to “private persons”).
317. The entire doctrine of preemption reflects this: the doctrine addresses
whether a federal statute displaces state regulations that, before the federal
statute’s enactment, were perfectly valid exercises of state authority. See
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
727, 730 (2008). Preemption doctrine explicitly recognizes that federal statutes
may displace even state regulations that fall within the states’ “historic police
powers.” See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (noting the
circumstances under which the “historic police powers of the States” may be
superseded by federal law). Many (if not most) cases finding preemption in-
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Commerce Clause holdings in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison the Supreme Court has returned to exclusivity to some extent, ruling that Congress did not have power
to regulate a particular subject because the States did have
regulatory power.318 Dissenting, Justice Souter (joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer) recognized and criticized
the majority’s exclusivist assumptions, arguing that the fact
that states have the power to regulate such matters as education and the family says absolutely nothing about whether
Congress also has power to regulate these subjects.319 This is
not to suggest that the Court has retrenched to a strong form of
exclusivity; preemption doctrine’s continuing recognition that
Congress can regulate to displace states’ historical police powers rests on recognition of same-effect concurrence.320 Nonetheless, Lopez and Morrison at the very least illustrate the resilience of exclusivity’s pull.
*****
To conclude, in context after context the Supreme Court
has begun with exclusivist assumptions only to ultimately conclude that more than one institution can exercise the type of
power that the Constitution’s text appeared to grant to only a
single specified institution. A nonexhaustive321 list follows.
1. The Court’s initial understanding in Marbury that the
Supreme Court could not be given original jurisdiction beyond
volve statutes enacted pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. See,
e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992).
318. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–19, 626–27; United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 552–54 (1995). The case of City of Boerne v. Flores, however, is not
properly understood as part of the countertrajectory from concurrence to exclusivity. See 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). Boerne does not embrace a principle of
exclusivity that only the Supreme Court has the power to interpret the Constitution, but instead lays down a categorical rule of conflict-resolution to the effect that the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations categorically
trump the interpretations of other institutions. See id. at 535–36. There is a
sharp and important analytical distinction between an exclusivist rule that
denies power to a second institution and a conflict-resolution rule. For more on
conflict-resolution rules, see infra Part V.
319. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 639 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It does not at
all follow that an activity affecting commerce nonetheless falls outside the
commerce power, depending on . . . the authority of a State to regulate it along
with Congress.”).
320. See supra note 317.
321. To provide yet another example, Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence expressly recognizes that presidential and congressional powers overlap to some extent. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure),
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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what the Constitution granted gave way to the Ames decision,
which permitted inferior federal courts to exercise original jurisdiction over matters that the Constitution had granted to the
Supreme Court.322
2. The Court’s original understanding that only juries
could find facts has been displaced by a regime in which federal
judges and administrative judges find facts during adjudication.323
3. The Court’s original view that only Article III courts can
exercise federal judicial power has given way to the understanding that non-Article III courts can exercise federal adjudicatory power.324
4. The original view that only Congress can exercise legislative power has given way to the understanding that administrative agencies have the power to create de facto law.325
5. The original view that certain international obligations
could be created only through the treaty process has given way
to the understanding that virtually all international obligations
can be created either by treaty or by congressional-executive
agreements.326
6. The original view that each state’s regulatory authority
extended only up to its borders has given way to the understanding that often more than one state has the power to regulate a given person, transaction, or occurrence.327
7. The early view that only the President can pardon has
given way to the understanding that Congress can create functionally equivalent amnesties.328
In short, there has been a strong pattern across many doctrinal contexts where the Court’s initial exclusivist assumptions have given way to an acceptance of concurrence. The shift
has not occurred everywhere, and sometimes has been followed
by a retrenchment back to exclusivity.329 But, as a purely descriptive matter, many important governmental powers are
now understood to be exercisable by more than one governmental institution.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part II.E.
See supra Part II.F.
See supra Part II.G.
See supra Part II.H.
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III. HOW AND WHY CONCURRENCE IS CREATED
This Part examines the mechanisms by which concurrence
has been created as well as the reasons for the shift from exclusivity to concurrence.
A. MECHANISMS FOR CREATING CONCURRENCE
As shown in Part II, the judiciary tends to start with exclusivist assumptions. Consequently, the move toward concurrence typically has been initiated by nonjudicial institutions.
There are three mechanisms by which concurrence has been
created: delegation, inherency, and breach-stepping.
1. Delegation
The most widespread mechanism for creating concurrence
is delegation.330 For example, Congress regularly delegates explicit rulemaking authority to agencies.331 Congress implicitly
delegates similar authority to courts when it enacts open-ended
statutory language and decides against tasking agencies with
rulemaking authority to flesh out the statutory language.332 I
will call these “Type 1 delegations.” Type 1 delegations result in
concurrence because Congress does not divest itself of its legislative power, but instead retains the power to make law as
well.
“Type 2 delegations” are exemplified by congressional delegations of adjudicatory authority to Article I courts.333 Type 2
delegations also result in concurrence. For instance, as shown
in Part II.C, Article I and Article III courts share significant
adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Why distinguish between Type 1 and Type 2 delegations?
In Type 1 delegations the delegator delegates its own authority,
whereas in Type 2 delegations the delegator delegates another
institution’s authority.334 The distinction between the two
330. Cf. Gary Lawson, Changing Images of the State: The Rise and Rise of
the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231–39 (1994) (discussing
the prevalence of congressional delegation and the growth of the administrative state).
331. See supra note 248.
332. See Merrill, supra note 247, at 40–46.
333. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 1424(b) (2006) (vesting the District Court of
Guam with “the jurisdiction of a district court of the United States . . . and
that of a bankruptcy court of the United States”).
334. Compare Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164 –65 (1991) (delegating congressional power to designate drugs as controlled substances to the
Attorney General), with Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 24 (1828)
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forms of delegation may be important because institutional
self-interest may operate as a check against overly extensive
Type 1 delegations but not Type 2 delegations.335 On the other
hand, self-interest sometimes may lead to excessive Type 1 delegations as, for instance, when Congress delegates so as to blur
lines of political accountability.336
Three further observations concerning delegation are in
order. First, Congress is not the only institution that can delegate. For example, the posse comitatus doctrine is an instance
of executive delegation to the private sector; the doctrine required private citizens to assist in the enforcement of federal
law.337
Second, delegation is the mechanism most closely associated with same-source concurrence. For example, executive
agencies are readily conceptualized as exercising legislative authority that has been delegated by Congress when they make
rules.338 On the other hand, delegation does not invariably give
rise to same-source concurrence. As we have seen, many courts
and scholars have insisted that Article I courts do not exercise
Article III judicial power,339 and that agencies do not exercise
Article I legislative power.340
Third, the propriety of a particular delegation demands
consideration of not only the nature of the powers delegated,
but also the identity of the delegee. In this regard, it frequently
is easier to delegate powers to a new institution than to an institution created by the Constitution with respect to which delegated powers might be incompatible with its constitutional
duties.341

(delegating the authority of admiralty jurisdiction from Article III courts to
non-Article III territorial courts).
335. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 2099.
336. See Sunstein, supra note 77, at 319–20.
337. See generally Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine:
Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth Century America, 26
LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 1–11 (2008) (providing an overview of the posse comitatus
doctrine and its application during the mid-nineteenth century in the United
States).
338. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 2099.
339. See supra Part II.C.
340. See supra Part I.C.1.a.ii.
341. See Lawson, supra note 330, at 1240.
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2. Inherency
Let us call the second mechanism for creating concurrence
“inherency.”342 Under inherency, an institution claims that its
constitutionally granted powers authorize it to undertake act X,
where that act is (at least) functionally identical to what another institution can undertake. For instance, the Court has held
that Congress’s power to regulate commerce343 subsumes the
power to enact immunity statutes that are functionally equivalent to the President’s pardon power.344 Inherency almost always gives rise to same-effect concurrence, though it theoretically can create same-source concurrence where the
Constitution does not clearly indicate which institution is allocated a particular power. For example, the Guarantee Clause
states that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”345 The Supreme Court has held that the “United States” refers to Congress,346 and has suggested that the language also can encompass the President.347 The Guarantee Clause accordingly may
give rise to the rare phenomenon of inherency-created samesource concurrence.
3. Breach-Stepping
The third mechanism for creating concurrence is when one
institution with clear authority to undertake act X does not,
and a second proactive institution “steps into the breach.”348
Though breach-stepping typically can be described as an in342. I borrow this excellent term from Professor Merrill. See Merrill, supra
note 50, at 2101.
343. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
344. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896).
345. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added).
346. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42–44 (1849); see also Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 219–23 (1962) (explaining the Court’s holding in Luther).
347. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 729–30 (1868) (noting
“measures which have been taken, under [the Guarantee Clause], by the executive and legislative departments of the National government,” though ultimately concluding that “the power to carry into effect the clause of guaranty
is primarily a legislative power, and resides in Congress”), overruled in part on
other grounds by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885).
348. Justice Jackson alluded to this sort of mechanism in his Youngstown
concurrence when he observed that “[w]e may say that power to legislate for
emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can
prevent power from slipping through its fingers,” and suggested that the President likely would act in such circumstances. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

2010]

FROM EXCLUSIVITY TO CONCURRENCE

1117

stance of either delegation or inherency, it merits distinct
treatment insofar as there are circumstances where the proactive institution appears to be driven to act by a perceived need;
in a breach-stepping circumstance, the proactive institution
does not seem to be acting on the view that it is merely exercising delegated or inherent powers.
A good illustration is provided by the facts in United States
v. Midwest Oil Co.349 An act of Congress provided that public
lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils were to be
“free and open to occupation, exploration, and purchase by citizens of the United States.”350 After deciding that oil was being
extracted too rapidly, with the result that the government soon
would be “obliged to repurchase the very oil that it ha[d] practically given away” due to the Navy’s increasing use of fuel, the
President issued a proclamation withdrawing the rights to extract petroleum from select public lands.351
Midwest Oil Company continued to extract oil following the
President’s decree, and was sued for doing so.352 Midwest argued in court that the executive order was null insofar as it was
not authorized by statute but, to the contrary, contradicted an
act of Congress that permitted petroleum extraction.353 The
Supreme Court upheld the President’s proclamation.354 The
Court provided two primary justifications. One was that although “no . . . express authority has been granted” to the President to withdraw rights to drill for oil, “there is nothing in the
nature of the power exercised which prevents Congress from
granting it by implication.”355 This rationale reduces to an (implied) delegation justification for the President’s exercise of essentially legislative powers, but it is unpersuasive: why should
the statute opening public lands be understood as impliedly authorizing the President to withdraw those lands?
The Court’s second justification is far more compelling.356
“[G]overnment is a practical affair, intended for practical men,”
said the Court, and Congress’s “rules or laws for the disposal of
349. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
350. Id. at 466 (quoting Act of Feb. 11, 1897, ch. 216, 29 Stat. 526, superseded by 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–287 (2006)).
351. Id. at 466–67.
352. Id. at 468–69.
353. See id. at 468.
354. See id. at 483.
355. Id. at 474.
356. The Court also pointed to a past practice of executive withdrawal of
public lands. See id. at 469–72.
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public land are necessarily general in their nature” such that
“[e]mergencies may occur, or conditions may so change as to require that the agent in charge should, in the public interest,
withhold the land from sale.”357 In other words, congressional
inaction provided the justification for presidential initiative.
Though this could be redescribed as an instance of inherency—
that executive authority encompasses the power to deviate
from general legislative dictates when necessary—the Court
did not justify the President’s actions in such terms.358
Breach-stepping is the mechanism that has given rise to
the concurrent rulemaking authority as between Congress and
federal courts that characterizes the dormant Commerce
Clause. Congress has unquestioned authority to disallow (or
approve) all the state regulations that federal courts have
deemed presumptively unlawful under the dormant Commerce
Clause.359 The Supreme Court has not yet pointed to a persuasive doctrinal basis in which to ground its dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine,360 so why has the Court proceeded to generate
federal common law in this area? The most likely answer is
that the Court deems federal inaction in the face of discriminatory state laws to be unacceptable, and so it has stepped into
the breach of congressional inaction and taken the initiative.361
The same can be said of federal common law itself. Although federal common law-making plausibly can be justified
on inherency grounds—on the theory that Article III’s judicial
power encompasses common law-making powers362 over mat357. Id. at 474.
358. The Court refused to endorse the President’s effort to ground his powers to issue the Proclamation in his Commander-in-Chief powers. See id. at
468. Additionally, much of the Court’s reasoning seemed to turn on the fact
that the case concerned public lands. See id. at 474 –75. For an illuminating
analysis of the case, see Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 44 –45 (1993).
359. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
360. See Camps Newfound v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610–18
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
361. See id. at 618–20.
362. I would add the caveat that federal courts’ common law-making powers exist only to the extent that they were not statutorily preempted, as it
were, by the Rules of Decision Act. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Common
Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist”
Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 795 (1989). This suggests that the Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is harder to justify than run-of-themill federal common law insofar as dormant Commerce Clause doctrine operates as federal law where state law otherwise would seem to be appropriately
applied under the Rules of Decision Act. See id.
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ters that do not lie within the competency of states363—what
actually has driven the Court to create federal common law is
better described as breach-stepping than as inherency. After
all, even after the embrace of legal positivism in Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins, which made it important to identify the source of
judges’ power to generate common law,364 the Supreme Court
typically neglects to specify the source of the federal common
law rules it announces and instead justifies its common lawmaking on the grounds of necessity. For example, in Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, one of the first post-Erie federal
common law cases, the Court held that “[t]he rights and duties
of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are
governed by federal rather than local law.”365 Explaining that
“[i]n the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the
federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to
their own standards,” the Court failed to explain the source of
federal courts’ power to fashion law absent congressional action.366 Similarly, in a decision handed down the same day as
Erie, Justice Brandeis wrote that the apportionment of an interstate stream’s water presents a “question of ‘federal common
law.’”367 Brandeis cited to earlier cases for the principle, but
neither he nor the cited cases explained the source of federal
courts’ powers to create such federal common law—an essential
issue following Erie’s embrace of positivism.368
363. In other words, the rule first announced in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), perhaps is best understood as a federalism doctrine rather
than a doctrine that addresses the nature of federal judicial power. Federal
courts have common law authority, except in diversity cases where state law
provides the substantive rule of decision. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law:
The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 922–24 (1986)
(making a similar argument).
364. Prior to Erie, common law was widely understood as being judicial articulation of preexisting natural law rather than judicial creation. See Erie,
304 U.S. at 79 (asserting that Swift v. Tyson’s sanctioning of federal courts’
common law powers rested on the “fallac[ious]” natural law belief that there is
a “transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory
within it unless and until changed by statute”). But see Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673, 683
(1998) (challenging this account). If, following Erie, there was no “transcendental body” of law that courts merely declared when they announced common
law, then what was the source of the common law rule that a federal court declared?
365. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
366. Id. at 366–67.
367. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,
110 (1938).
368. See id. Though some lower courts and modern commentators similarly
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To be sure, in some contexts the Court has attempted to
explain the source of its powers to generate federal common
law. Yet even here it is hard to escape the conclusion that a
perceived need to act, rather than firm belief in its inherent
powers, drove the Court’s decision because its inherency justifications have been remarkably flimsy. First consider the federal
common law of admiralty and interstate conflicts. The Court
has said that the source of federal courts’ authority to generate
admiralty law is the Constitution’s “grant of general admiralty
jurisdiction to the federal courts.”369 As many have observed,
however, this justification is inconsistent with Erie’s holding
that the Constitution’s grant of diversity jurisdiction does not
empower federal courts to create general common law in diversity cases insofar as “there is no obviously relevant difference
in the texts of the diversity and admiralty jurisdictional
grants.”370 In other words, if the diversity grant gives courts adjudicatory jurisdiction but not the power to fashion substantive
common law rules, why should the admiralty grant operate differently?
Consider, as well, the Court’s holding in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills371 that federal courts’ powers to create a
body of federal law to enforce collective bargaining agreements
came from the Labor Management Relations Act’s (LMRA) provision stating that federal courts have jurisdiction over “[s]uits
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . in an industry affecting commerce.”372 Fairly
read, this statutory provision is a jurisdictional grant—which
the Court acknowledged.373 Reliance on a jurisdictional grant
as the source of a court’s power to generate federal common law
have sought to ground federal common law-making power in the Constitution’s jurisdictional grant over interstate controversies, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 732–43 (5th ed. 2003) (gathering sources), the same Erie-based critique leveled at the Court’s reliance on the Admiralty Jurisdiction Clause applies here. If the diversity grant gives courts adjudicatory jurisdiction but not
the power to fashion substantive common law rules, why should the interstate
controversy grant operate differently?
369. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95–
96 (1981).
370. Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 312
(1999).
371. 353 U.S. 448, 451–52 (1957).
372. Id. at 449–50 (relying on 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006)).
373. Id. at 452 (stating the question before the Court as being whether the
statutory provision at issue is “more than jurisdictional”).
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accordingly is subject to the same sort of post-Erie critique leveled against the Court’s federal common law of admiralty: why
should the LMRA’s jurisdictional grant be the source of common law powers if the diversity grant is not?374 Lincoln Mills
also relied on what Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court
termed “a few shafts of light” in the legislative history to buttress its conclusion,375 but “[t]he Court’s handling of the legislative history was severely criticized by the dissent and, subsequently, by commentators.”376
In all these cases, breach-stepping rather than inherency
better describes what prompted the Court’s decision to go forward with federal common law-making and thereby create concurrency.
B. REASONS FOR CONCURRENCE
This subpart explains why there has been a shift from exclusivity to concurrence in so many contexts. The analysis begins by exploring the Court’s explanations, all of which have
stressed situation-specific pragmatic considerations. Frequently, the Court also was able to point either to historical precedents or to the fact that the practice of concurrence had become
deeply entrenched.
The Court’s pragmatic explanations, however, typically do
not venture beyond relatively undeveloped assertions that concurrence is practical or efficient in the circumstance at hand.
Concurrence’s benefits can be further cashed out. Not limiting
analysis to the justifications provided in the case law seems
particularly appropriate in view of the fact that concurrence
typically originates extrajudicially. By analyzing concurrence
as a phenomenon that occurs across multiple doctrinal contexts, rather than confining analysis to only one context at a
time, one can find recurring patterns as to what concurrence
can accomplish.
1. Pragmatics and Past Practice
The Ames Court, it should be recalled, reversed course
from Marbury and upheld Congress’s allocation of original jurisdiction to inferior federal courts of cases involving states and
374. See supra note 368 (noting a similar critique that can be leveled at the
various efforts that have been made to explain federal courts’ powers to create
federal common law to resolve interstate controversies).
375. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 452.
376. Merrill, supra note 247, at 40 & nn.180–81.

1122

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[94:1051

ambassadors.377 It premised its holding on the basis of
longstanding practice and practicality.378 Ames reasoned on the
basis of an analogous practice that had arisen in relation to inferior federal courts’ jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors.379 The same section of the Constitution that grants the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over suits involving states
provides that “the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction . . . [i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors.”380 Since the early days of our Republic, however, this language has not been
understood to mean that only the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction in cases affecting Ambassadors. The 1789 Judiciary
Act provided that the Supreme Court “‘shall have exclusively
all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors’” but “‘original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all suits
brought by ambassadors . . . .’”381 The Court specifically noted
that this legislation reflected Congress’s “construction” of the
Constitution,382 and the Court provided a practical rationale for
Congress’s “understand[ing] that the original jurisdiction
vested in the Supreme Court was [not] necessarily exclusive”383:
[K]eep[ing] open the highest court of the nation for the determination,
in the first instance, of suits involving . . . a diplomat or commercial

377. See supra Part II.A.
378. See Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 469 (1883) (noting Congress’s
“practical construction” of the provision and that “no court of the United
States has ever in its actual adjudications determined” that the provision did
not confer concurrent jurisdiction). Tellingly, the Ames Court did not distinguish Marbury on the basis of the Constitution’s specification that “[i]n all
other Cases, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction.” See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). It quite plausibly could have been
argued on the basis of this language that the Supreme Court could not have
original jurisdiction over matters for which the Constitution granted it appellate jurisdiction.
379. See Ames, 111 U.S. at 463–64 (noting that the Judiciary Act of 1789
provided the Supreme Court with concurrent jurisdiction over suits brought by
ambassadors).
380. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
381. Ames, 111 U.S. at 463–64 (quoting the Judiciary Act of 1789) (emphasis added).
382. Id. at 464. The Ames Court also observed that this construction was
provided by “the first Congress, in which were many who had been leading
and influential members of the convention, and who were familiar with the
discussions that preceded the adoption of the Constitution by the States and
with the objections urged against it.” Id. This raises an obvious question:
shouldn’t these same considerations have led the Court to decide Marbury differently?
383. Id.
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representative of a foreign government . . . was due to the rank and
dignity of those for whom the [constitutional] provision was made; but
to . . . deprive an ambassador, public minister or consul of the privilege of suing in any court he chose having jurisdiction of the parties
and the subject matter of his action, would be, in many cases, to convert what was intended as a favor into a burden.384

The Ames Court also was impressed that this longstanding
practice was popularly accepted.385
Likewise, the Supreme Court and commentators386 have
acknowledged that considerations of practicality drove the
Court’s jurisprudence upholding concurrent power as between
Article I tribunals and Article III courts. Justice Harlan’s decision for the Court in the Glidden Co. v. Zdanok387 decision is
exemplary. Justice Harlan traced non-Article III federal courts
back to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in the above-discussed
Canter case, which upheld a territorial court’s power to hear a
case that also fell under Article III admiralty jurisdiction.388
Applauding Canter’s holding, Harlan said “[t]he reasons for
[Canter’s holding] are not difficult to appreciate so long as the
character of the early territories and some of the practical problems arising from their administration are kept in mind.”389
There was “no state government to assume the burden of local
regulation,” with the result that “courts had to be established
and staffed with sufficient judges to handle the general jurisdiction that elsewhere would have been exercised in large part
by the courts of a State.”390 It was imperative that these territorial courts not be staffed by life-tenured Article III judges be384. Id.
385. See id. at 465–66. Ames noted that one of the opinions was contemporaneous with the decision of Chisholm v. Georgia, which famously caused immediate controversy and led to the quick adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. “It is a fact of some significance, in this connection, that although the
decision in [Chisholm] attracted immediate attention, and caused great irritation in some of the states,” that the decisions concerning ambassadors, “which
in effect held that the original jurisdiction of the supreme court was not necessarily exclusive, seems to have provoked no special comment.” Id. at 466.
386. See Bator, supra note 215, at 254 (“The justification for the existence
of territorial courts has always been essentially pragmatic.”); Monaghan, supra note 26, at 868 (“The expanding national government and the rapidly expanding national domain quickly rendered [exclusivity] untenable.”).
387. 370 U.S. 530, 584 (1962) (holding that the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are Article III courts).
388. Id. at 544 (“The concept of a legislative court derives from the opinion
of Chief Justice Marshall in [Canter], dealing with courts established in a territory.” (citation omitted)).
389. Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
390. Id.
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cause there would have been no need for them after the territories became states and created their own (state) courts.
This consideration, as well as other “problems not foreseen
by the Framers of Article III,” Justice Harlan says, explained
Canter: “Against this historical background, it is hardly surprising that Chief Justice Marshall decided as he did. It would
have been doctrinaire in the extreme”391 to rule otherwise. Instead, continued Harlan, Chief Justice Marshall was “conscious
as ever of his responsibility to see the Constitution work” and
accordingly “recognized a greater flexibility in Congress to deal
with problems arising outside the normal context of a federal
system.”392 Harlan then generalized, explaining that “[t]he
same confluence of practical considerations that dictated the
result in Canter has governed the decisions in later cases sanctioning the creation of other courts with judges of limited tenure” and that otherwise do not conform to the requirements of
Article III.393
The Court also has relied on historical practice and practical considerations in its other decisions upholding non-Article
III tribunals. In the landmark case of Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., for instance, the Court upheld
the non-Article III procedure for collecting federal taxes on the
historical grounds that it did “not differ in principle from those
employed in England from remote antiquity—and in many of
the States, so far as we know without objection.”394 The Court
then explained the pragmatic basis for this practice:
[P]robably there are few governments which do or can permit their
claims for public taxes, either on the citizen or the officer employed
for their collection or disbursement, to become subjects of judicial controversy, according to the course of the law of the land. Imperative necessity has forced a distinction between such claims and all others . . . .395

The nation’s courts-martial similarly have been justified on
the basis of historical practice and practicality. Emphasizing
the former, the early decision of Dynes v. Hoover concluded that
“Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offences in the manner then and
391. Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
392. Id. at 547.
393. Id.
394. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 281 (1855); see also supra Part II.C (laying out the facts of this case
in detail).
395. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 282 (emphasis added).
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now practiced by civilized nations.”396 Emphasizing considerations of practicality, Ex parte Quirin rejected the view that offenses against the laws of war are subject to the requirements
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, holding instead that such
offenses can be tried in military tribunals, “which are not
courts in the sense of the Judiciary Article, and which in the
natural course of events are usually called upon to function under conditions precluding resort to such procedures.”397 Consistent with Ex parte Quirin, the landmark decision of Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld candidly acknowledged that “[t]he military commission, a tribunal neither mentioned in the Constitution nor
created by statute, was born of military necessity.”398
Sometimes pragmatic considerations alone, absent historical pedigree, have proven to be sufficient justification for the
Court. Consider in this regard its forgiving nondelegation doctrine. As the Court has said in its more candid moments, “[O]ur
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding
that in our increasingly complex society . . . Congress simply
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power.”399 This
justification has been elaborated and defended by multiple
scholars.400
2. Efficiency
Pragmatics without pedigree has been a sufficient justification for concurrence in the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence examined above in Part II.B. The judicial decisions
allowing concurrent fact-finding powers between judge and jury
were driven primarily by considerations of efficiency and re396. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857).
397. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942) (citations omitted).
398. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590 (2006).
399. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) (“To burden Congress with all federal
rulemaking would divert that branch from more pressing issues, and defeat
the Framers’ design of a workable National Government.”); Am. Power &
Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (“The judicial approval accorded
these ‘broad’ standards for administrative action is a reflection of the necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems.”).
400. Merrill, supra note 50, at 2151–59, 2164 –65 (summarizing the arguments in support of broad delegation powers and concluding that agencies are
“far better” at making federal policy on “many and perhaps most issues”);
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 57, at 1743–45 (“All institutions must take direction from a person, or a small group of people, but the leader of an institution cannot possibly perform all of its tasks directly. Instead, the leader or
principal delegates broad authority to agents.”).
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source preservation. The Munson decision, which rejected the
rule under which questions were submitted to the jury as long
as there was “any evidence,” justified its new approach by citing to “recent decisions of high authority” that “have established a more reasonable rule.”401 The “high authority” that the
Supreme Court cited all were English cases that postdated
1791, the year that the Seventh Amendment was adopted, and
hence were not legally binding authority.402 Moreover, none of
the cases went so far as to support the Court’s rule that judges
can “take cases away from the jury when there are disputes of
pure questions of fact.”403 The conclusion is inescapable that
what ultimately led the Supreme Court to adopt its new rule in
Munson was its belief that the new rule was—as the Court itself said—“more reasonable” than the old one: why let a case go
to the jury, even if there were some evidence in support of the
plaintiff’s position, if a jury could not “properly proceed to find
a verdict” for the nonmoving party?404 Doing so would only
waste the valuable time of the court, jury, and parties.405
The Galloway decision, which determined that directed
verdicts on grounds of insufficiency of evidence did not violate
the Seventh Amendment, likewise grounded its holding on considerations of practice and practicality. The “short answer” as
to why “the Amendment [does not] deprive[] the federal courts
of power to direct a verdict for insufficiency of evidence,” explained the Court, is that any contention to the contrary “has
been foreclosed by repeated decisions made here consistently
for nearly a century” with the result that any “objection therefore comes too late.”406 But the Galloway Court did not end its
analysis there, as it also aimed to establish that “the consequences flowing from” the proposition that a judge’s only response to insufficient evidence was to order a new trial “are sufficient to refute it.”407 The conclusion that the Seventh
Amendment demanded a new trial after the plaintiff had failed
to provide sufficient evidence in the first, said the Court, would
401. Schuylkill & Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
442, 448 (1871) (emphasis added).
402. See Sward, supra note 140, at 594 (noting that the earliest of these
cases had been decided in 1853).
403. Id. at 599.
404. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 448 (emphasis added).
405. See Pa. R.R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 343 (1933) (“Such a practice . . . saves time and expense . . . .”).
406. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389 (1943).
407. Id. at 392.
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lead to “endless repetition of litigation and unlimited chance,
by education gained at the opposing party’s expense, for perfecting a case at other trials.”408
Sometimes considerations of practicality alone—despite
the absence of longstanding practice and, sometimes, even contrary to longstanding practice—have been sufficient to motivate the Court to accept concurrence. Consider in this regard
the Redman Court’s decision that a federal court could disregard a jury’s verdict and substitute its own by granting an immediate verdict on behalf of the party who had lost in the jury’s
eyes.409 Unlike Munson and Galloway, the Redman Court was
unable to justify its new rule on grounds of past practice because the Court only twenty years earlier, in the Slocum case,
had flatly rejected the proposition that Redman embraced.410
Remarkably, Slocum notwithstanding, the Redman Court
labored to demonstrate that its holding was consistent with
precedent. This effort is not at all convincing.411 Since the legal
408. Id. at 393.
409. See Balt. & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 661 (1935) (“[W]e
reach the conclusion that the judgment of reversal for the error in denying the
motions should embody a direction for a judgment of dismissal on the merits,
and not for a new trial.”); see also supra note 167.
410. See Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 380 (1913) (“When the
verdict was set aside the issues of fact were left undetermined, and . . . no
judgment on the merits could be given. The new determination . . . could be
had only through a new trial, with the same right to a jury as before.”). Indeed, the Second Circuit decision that the Supreme Court’s ruling reversed in
Redman had relied on Slocum for the proposition that a new trial was the only
remedy for a judge’s determination that a jury’s verdict had been based on insufficient evidence. See Redman, 295 U.S. at 656 (“But the court of appeals
ruled that under our decision in Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. the
direction must be for a new trial.” (footnote omitted)). The Supreme Court in
the Redman decision itself acknowledged that “some parts of the [Slocum]
opinion give color to the interpretation put on it by the Court of Appeals.” Id.
at 661. This is an understatement: as explained in Part II.B, Slocum had cited
to many earlier-decided Supreme Court cases that had flatly asserted that only juries could make the ultimate determinations as to facts that ground the
verdict.
411. See Redman, 295 U.S. at 659–60 (distinguishing Slocum). Redman’s
holding turned on a highly technical distinction. Unlike Slocum, the defendant
in Redman had moved for a directed verdict on the grounds of insufficient evidence after evidence had been adduced at trial but before the verdict was rendered, and the trial court had reserved its decision on the defendant’s motion.
The Redman Court then pointed to the common law procedure known as the
“special case,” under which courts could submit the case to the jury subject to
reserved questions of law and, following the verdict, award the verdict to a different party than the jury depending upon how the court resolved the reserved
question. Id. at 659–60.
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materials before the Redman Court alone cannot explain its decision, the efficiency-minded practical reasons the Court adduced most likely are what fueled its decision. Like other practices that had been approved, allowing the judge to disregard a
jury’s verdict and grant an immediate verdict would give “better opportunity for considered rulings, ma[ke] new trials less
frequent” and for these reasons could be expected to “command[] . . . general approval” of litigants over time.412
3. Circumstances Not Anticipated by the Founders
In several contexts, the Court has justified concurrence on
the ground that it was necessary to meet circumstances not anticipated by our Constitution’s Founders. Justice Harlan justified Article I courts on this basis, explaining that they were necessary to meet “problems not foreseen by the Framers of
Article III.”413 Administrative agencies’ rulemaking powers similarly have been justified on the ground that “in our increasingly complex society . . . Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power.”414 Scholars arguing in favor
of congressional-executive agreements have argued that the
Founders did not anticipate exactly how difficult the treaty
process would be, or the prominent role that the United States
would play on the international stage.415 Similar arguments
have been proffered as to the unanticipated difficulty of Article
V’s amendment requirements to explain de facto amendments
by the Court via constitutional interpretation.416

412. Id. at 660.
413. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 546 (1962).
414. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329
U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
415. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 861–96 (describing the conflict that arose between isolationists and internationalists prior to and during
World War II as the result of the Senate’s “monopoly” on foreign policy).
416. See, e.g., Thomas Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case
for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 824 (2005) (“[T]he
American Constitution . . . contains no adequate mechanism for making
needed changes in the assignment of powers between the levels of government. . . . [T]he solution . . . has been judicial amendments of the Constitution
. . . .”); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499,
1514 (2009) (“[O]ur practice of judicial interpretation uses Article III to work
around the obstruction to good governance produced by the difficult amendment procedures of Article V.”).
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4. Workarounds
Concurrence has been turned to as a workaround because
the institution most obviously tasked by the Constitution has
not acted.417 Sometimes there are obvious practical barriers
that account for the most suitable candidate’s inaction. For instance, in theory, Congress could enact as legislation every
administrative agency’s rule. Given the size of the country today and the perceived need for the federal government’s involvement, however, this simply is not possible.
Sometimes concurrence has been created when it is less
obvious why the most obviously tasked institution has failed to
act. Consider in this regard the federal courts’ dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and federal common law.418 As discussed
in the next subpart, however, considerations of the different institutional characteristics of courts and legislatures may help
to explain why courts rather than Congress have acted here.
Finally, and most controversial of all, concurrence occasionally has been used to avoid constitutional limitations that
hindered the most obvious institution from undertaking a particular task. Consider in this regard Professor Pfander’s discussion of the Article I tribunal known as the Court of Claims.419
When the colonies were settled, a private party (such as contractors and other public creditors) who had a “public claim”
against government would submit petitions for payment directly to the legislature.420 “Shortly after the Revolution, states began to experiment with the judicial determination of public
claims.”421 Congress wished to meld these two practices together by having courts take the first crack at public claims, but retaining ultimate control in deciding what public claims to ultimately authorize.422 The Invalid Pensions Act of 1792 required
417. After writing this Article, I came across a piece written by Mark
Tushnet that addresses a similar phenomenon by means of the identical terminology. See Tushnet, supra note 416.
418. See supra notes 359–76 and accompanying text.
419. See Pfander, supra note 22, at 699–706 (arguing that the creation of
the Court of Claims was driven by the Supreme Court’s refusal to submit decisions of the courts to executive or legislative review).
420. See id. at 701 (“Contractors and other public creditors would submit
legislative petitions for payment, which were funneled to the proper committee
of the assembly; if favorably impressed, the committee would recommend inclusion of payment in the annual appropriations bill.”).
421. See id.
422. See id. at 699 (describing the claims process imposed by the Invalid
Pensions Act of 1792).
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Article III courts to “hear the pension claims of veterans, to estimate the degree of their disability, and to propose the proper
amount of compensation due them.”423 The federal court’s estimates thereafter were to be “review[ed] first by the Secretary of
War and then by Congress.”424
However, the Court in Hayburn’s Case strongly disapproved of this mechanism of initial judicial review followed by
executive and legislative review, and argued that Article III requires that the judiciary’s decisions be final in the sense of not
being reviewable by nonjudicial institutions.425 Hayburn’s
Case’s finality requirement led Congress to create the nonArticle III Court of Claims in 1855.426 “In creating the Court of
Claims, Congress was said to have created an Article I tribunal
subject to legislative oversight and free from the constraints of
Article III.”427 As Pfander nicely puts it, Hayburn’s Case “purchased judicial independence at the price of forcing Congress to
turn to other institutions to perform the function of preliminary
adjudication.”428 The Court of Claims is not unique in this regard; other non-Article III tribunals were created to circumvent
other Article III requirements.429
Such a use of concurrence presents difficult legitimacy
challenges: was the Court of Claims a brilliant workaround, or
an unconstitutional end-run around Article III’s finality requirement? I return to this query in Part VI.430

423. Id.
424. Id.
425. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 409 n.(a) (1792) (“‘[B]y the
constitution, neither the secretary at war, nor any other executive officer, nor
even the legislature, are authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial
acts or opinions of this court.’” (quoting the Circuit Court for the District of
New York)).
426. See Pfander, supra note 22, at 703–04 (“By disclaiming an advisory or
preliminary role in the determination of benefit claims, the federal courts required Congress to fashion a non-Article III tribunal for the adjudication of
such claims.”).
427. Id. at 702–03.
428. Id. at 702.
429. See id. at 706–15 (arguing that Congress originally created nonArticle III territorial courts because it believed that inhabitants of territories
“lacked federal rights to enforce” and that territorial courts were local rather
than national courts).
430. See infra note 501.
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5. Interinstitutional Synergies
Although only occasionally justified in these terms, concurrence frequently arises in circumstances where the characteristics of the overlapping institutions are complementary such
that concurrence likely results in superior decision making and
action taking than exclusivity would. The Midwest Oil decision
is a rare instance where the Court justified concurrence in
terms of such institutional synergies.431 As discussed above, the
Court upheld the President’s decision to bar mineral extraction
from public lands, despite a statute that permitted such extraction, on the ground that “[e]mergencies may occur, or conditions may so change as to require that the agent in charge
should, in the public interest, withhold the land from sale.”432
Two institutional characteristics explain why the President is
better situated to respond to emergencies than Congress. First,
Congress primarily operates prospectively, enacting statutes
that have enduring effects, whereas the executive branch generally operates in the present, applying past congressional
enactments to present-day events. Call this the executive
branch’s “presentist” orientation. For these reasons, the President is better positioned than Congress to respond to changed
circumstances and emergencies. Second, the President can act
much faster than our bicameral, 535-member national legislature.
Courts and commentators point to similar institutional
synergies in relation to agency rulemaking. Agencies bring a
level of substantive expertise and deep experience that Congress cannot.433 Furthermore, since it is cheaper and easier to
modify agency rules than statutes,434 rules can more readily be
431. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)
(upholding a presidential proclamation withdrawing petroleum extraction
rights on select public lands).
432. Id. It is worth adding that the Court refused to endorse the President’s effort to ground his powers to issue the proclamation on his Commander-in-Chief powers. See id. at 468 (noting that the government argued that the
President’s proclamation was grounded in his power “as Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy,” but deciding the issue on other grounds). Much of the
Court’s reasoning arguably turned on the fact that the case concerned public
lands. See id. at 474 –75. For an illuminating analysis of the Midwest Oil
precedent, see Monaghan, supra note 358, at 44 –45.
433. For a comprehensive discussion of the relative institutional competencies of agencies and Congress, see Merrill, supra note 317.
434. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 95–97 (1994) (arguing that
the comparative complexity of rulemaking increases information costs, reduc-
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tailored to account for unanticipated effects and changed circumstances—yet another facet of the executive branch’s presentist orientation.
Much federal common law also can be understood through
the lens of institutional synergy. To see this, it is necessary to
disaggregate federal common law. First consider contexts
where federal courts have engaged in wholesale lawmaking
with virtually no congressional participation, as in admiralty,
interstate controversies,435 and (with the close conceptual relative to federal common law known as) dormant Commerce
Clause cases.436 This phenomenon of courts taking the first step
may occur in fields that are better-suited to inductive, groundup reasoning than the legislature’s more deductive process of
laying down prospective general principles. Inductive reasoning
can be expected to be a better method where it is difficult to anticipate the relevant decision-making criteria on an ex ante basis, or where there is uncertainty as to how multiple competing
considerations ought to be prioritized.437 In these contexts, legislatures either never intervene (but instead leave the field to
courts) or later codify (and frequently amend) the Court’s initial
resolutions. Either way, there is good reason to believe that the
ultimate outcomes will be better than what would have resulted if the courts had not first acted.
Institutional synergies also are found in the facet of federal
common law that consists of filling significant gaps in a statutory scheme. As with the executive’s relationship to Congress
discussed above, the institutional synergy in this context reing participation in rulemaking and lowering the cost of influencing outcomes).
435. It should be noted, though, that Congress may not have power to decide all interstate controversies. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law:
A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1323–26 (1996) (suggesting that Congress could not enact a statute to decide the boundaries between two states).
436. Henry Monaghan was among the first to point out the close relationship between federal common law and the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1975) (noting that “one of the most salient illustrations of
the Supreme Court’s derivation of federal rules of decision from the Constitution” is the invalidation of state laws under the dormant Commerce Clause).
437. There is an extensive literature that addresses the choice between inductive and deductive decision making. See generally Richard A. Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987) (using the concepts of deductive
and inductive reasoning to help define the terms “legal formalism” and “legal
realism”).
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sults from the judiciary’s more presentist orientation vis-à-vis
legislatures. Whereas legislatures operate prospectively, invariably suffering from imperfect foresight, courts operate on the
front lines, hearing live controversies. Consequently, courts are
regularly presented with scenarios unanticipated by legislatures and, relatedly, with the need to harmonize apparently
conflicting legal duties. Although legislatures have the power to
create as statutes the rules that courts fashion as federal common law in such circumstances, it may be advantageous to allow courts to take the first crack rather than leaving the gap
unfilled until Congress acts. Congress can always amend the
Court’s efforts, if it should so choose.
6. Emergencies
Finally, concurrence occasionally has been justified on the
ground that an emergency required either immediate action or
a deviation from ordinary institutional arrangements. Justice
Holmes upheld an administrative agency’s assumption of jury
fact-finding duties in Block v. Hirsh on the basis of the latter
justification—remedying the District of Columbia’s housing
shortage required fast action that only administrative factfinding could accomplish.438 And though the Court equivocated,
it may have upheld President Lincoln’s issuance of a proclamation appointing a provisional governor of Texas following the
Civil War and providing for the assembling of a convention to
adopt a new state constitution on the ground that immediate
action was necessary.439 The danger exists, of course, that the
emergency giving rise to the exception will be forgotten and the

438. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921) (“A part of the exigency is
to secure a speedy and summary administration of the law and we are not
prepared to say that the suspension of ordinary remedies was not a reasonable
provision of a statute reasonable in its aim and intent.”).
439. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 730 (1868), overruled in part
on other grounds by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885). The Court
said such actions “primarily” fell under Congress’s “legislative power” under
the Guarantee Clause, but then stated that the President’s actions were appropriately “considered as provisional” in light of the fact that it was “taken
after the term of the 38th Congress had expired.” Id. Elsewhere in the opinion,
the Court suggested that the President may have some independent powers
under the Guarantee Clause. See id. at 729 (determining that it was unnecessary to review the actions taken “by the executive and legislative departments” under the Guarantee Clause, and noting that it is “essential only that
the means must be necessary and proper” to restoring a republican form of
government, and that no action be taken “which is either prohibited or unsanctioned by the Constitution”).
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exception generalized. As explained above, that in fact is what
occurred with the Block case.440
IV. NOT ALL OR NOTHING
There is a chapter in the Hebrew Bible that consists of only
two sentences.441 The lesson: sometimes short but important
points deserve to be broken out on their own so they receive the
emphasis they deserve.
So too here. The choice between exclusivity and concurrence is not an “all or nothing” affair. This is true in two key
respects.
First, though there are many instances of concurrence,
there also are many contexts where power is held exclusively
by a single institution.442
Second, even where concurrence exists, there typically are
limits. For example, although federal courts have significant
power to create federal common law—and where they have this
power they accordingly share de facto lawmaking powers with
Congress—their common law-making powers are not coterminous with Congress’s lawmaking powers or with the federal
courts’ adjudicatory jurisdiction. Instead, there are all sorts of
(judge-made) limits that have been imposed or identified.443
Similarly, in the context of Article I courts, the Supreme Court
has labored to identify the limits to Congress’s powers to task
non-Article III courts with the sort of adjudicatory business
that falls within Article III jurisdiction.444 As well, the President’s “lawmaking” powers are limited to circumstances where
Congress has delegated to him rulemaking authority or, as the
great Steel Seizure case makes clear, the President has independent powers and Congress has not acted.445
The lesson that emerges from the fact that the choice between exclusivity and concurrence has not been “all or nothing”
440. See supra notes 176–85 and accompanying text; see also R.S. Radford,
Regulatory Takings Law in the 1990’s: The Death of Rent Control? 21 SW. U. L.
REV. 1019, 1029–30 (1992) (noting that although the Court struck down the
District of Columbia’s rent control ordinance in 1924 because the exigency no
longer existed, the concept of rent control has persisted).
441. Psalms 117.
442. See supra notes 306–08 and accompanying text.
443. See Field, supra note 363, at 927–34.
444. See Pfander, supra note 22, at 646–47, 656–57.
445. Mark D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against the View That Jackson’s Concurrence Resolves the Relation Between Congress and the Commander-in-Chief, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1705–06 (2007).
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is that slippery slope arguments regarding the choice between
exclusivity and concurrence are unconvincing;446 allowing concurrence in one context has not meant that exclusivity has been
rejected across the board. The choice between exclusivity and
concurrence has not been made on the basis of transsubstantive
principles (such as expressio unius est exclusio alterius to support exclusivity or an across-the-board rejection of expressio unius to support concurrency), but instead has been made by
means of context-specific analysis.447
V. METHODS FOR ADDRESSING CONFLICTS
If two or more institutions have overlapping powers, it is
possible that they could exercise their powers in inconsistent
ways and thereby generate conflicts. Indeed, the possibility of
conflict frequently is deemed to be a strong, and sometimes definitive, argument against concurrency.448
Such conflict anxiety, however, is overblown. There are
many contexts where two or more institutions have overlapping
powers, and American law has developed six different methods
for addressing such interinstitutional conflicts.449 Contextspecific institutional considerations, rather than transsubstantive principles, typically explain the selection of the method.450
That we already have at our disposal multiple mechanisms for
dealing with conflict suggests that the prospect of conflict is not
on its own a sufficient reason to rule out concurrence. At most,
the prospect of conflict constitutes a cost of concurrence that
appropriately is weighed against the benefits that concurrence
promises in a particular context.
A. SIX CONFLICT-RESOLUTION APPROACHES
Here is an overview of the six conflict-resolution approaches that can be found in American law.
1. Categorical Institution-Based Conflict Rule. One institution’s action categorically trumps the other institution. The Supremacy Clause is one such example, providing that federal law
446. See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 18, at 1051–55.
447. There are two competing ways this can be described: either as wise,
case-by-case, common law reasoning or as unprincipled, ad hoc decision making. I return to this question in Part VI.
448. See, e.g., MADISON, supra note 1, at 66.
449. Much of what follows in this Part is drawn from Rosen, supra note
445, at 1717–31.
450. Id. at 1743–44.
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categorically trumps state law.451 Another is the rule under
which federal statutes categorically trump federal common law
and dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. A final example
comes from Justice Jackson’s famed concurrence in the Steel
Seizure case.452 His Category Two recognized the possibility of
same-effect concurrence as between Congress and the President,453 but Category Three provides that the President can act
contrary to a statute only if he has independent power and
Congress’s statute exceeded its powers.454 Together, these two
categories mean that where the President and Congress have
concurrent powers, Congress’s acts categorically trump presidential acts.
2. Presumptive Institution-Based Conflict Rule. One institution presumptively, but noncategorically, trumps. For example, juries presumptively have the power to find facts in Article
III adjudications. The jury’s fact-finding powers, however, are
only presumptive insofar as they can be displaced by the judge
in limited circumstances: (1) before the jury has heard the case
if the judge determines that a reasonable jury could not return
a verdict for one of the parties455—a determination that almost
invariably involves fact-finding by the judge—and (2) during
trial or after the jury has rendered its verdict should the judge
decide that there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for
a reasonable jury to find on behalf of one of the parties456—
another determination that almost invariably involves judicial
fact-finding.
3. First-in-Time Conflict Rule. The institution that acts
first trumps. Examples include the application of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, as well as the common law doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, all of which resolve potential
conflicts among courts with overlapping adjudicatory jurisdiction by providing that the second court is bound by the first
court’s ruling.457
451. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
452. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,
634 –55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). For a full discussion, see Rosen, supra
note 445, at 1704 –06.
453. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637.
454. Id. at 637–38.
455. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (laying
out the standard for granting summary judgment).
456. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a), (b).
457. For a particularly bracing example of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause’s first-in-time rule, see Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908).

2010]

FROM EXCLUSIVITY TO CONCURRENCE

1137

4. Last-in-Time Conflict Rule. The institution that acts last
trumps. Examples include the relation among treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements, where conflicts are resolved on the basis of a last-intime rule.458 Another example can be found in the res judicata
rule applicable to the unusual circumstance where the party in
the second lawsuit neglected to assert the defense of res judicata: “When in two actions inconsistent final judgments are rendered, it is the later, not the earlier, judgment that is accorded
conclusive effect in a third action under the rules of res judicata.”459
5. Multifactor Conflict-Resolution Principles. Multifactor
conflict-resolution principles identify multiple factors that are
to be considered to resolve conflicts.460 An example includes the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws, which seeks to resolve conflicts where multiple states have overlapping regulatory jurisdiction by means of a virtual laundry list of considerations.461
6. No-Sorting Principles. Under a no-sorting principle, the
two institutions with overlapping authority are permitted to
simultaneously act, even if they act inconsistently.462 There are
several possible outcomes. First, the regulated entities may be
subject to multiple rules simultaneously, some of which may
conflict, and are expected to conform their behavior nonetheless.463 Other times, the different institutions with overlapping
authority may formally or informally negotiate among themselves to coordinate their actions.464 Such coordination typically
458. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (regarding treaties). For a description and defense, see Julian Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense
of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319,
325, 326–27 (2005).
459. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 (1980). The Restatement rule is based on several Supreme Court cases. See Rosen, supra note
445, at 1724 n.72.
460. See Rosen, supra note 445, at 1725–28.
461. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6(2) (1969).
462. For an example of a no-sorting principle in relation to congressional
and judicial power to interpret the Constitution, see Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2030–31
(2003).
463. This is true of state criminal law generally, and also is reflected in the
Double Jeopardy Clause’s “dual sovereignty” doctrine. See Rosen, supra note
445, at 1728–30.
464. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 115, at 803 & n.95 (discussing the negotiation among states that led to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,
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is undertaken by the political branches of government, not the
courts.
B. IMPLICATIONS
That there are multiple conflict-resolution principles in
United States law has many implications that merit articlelength treatment. Some crucial preliminary points nonetheless
bear mention here.
First and foremost, this array of principles should reduce
anxiety over the possibility of concurrence-induced conflict.
Simply put, there is an array of well-recognized methods for
dealing with conflicts.
Second, it is implicit in the multiplicity of conflictresolution principles that the possibility of conflict does not invariably lead to the deployment of any particular conflictresolution rule. Rather, some choice must be made among
them.
Past practice and logic point to many illuminating observations in relation to the choice among conflict-resolution principles. The first two principles—categorical institution-based
and presumptive institution-based conflicts rules—are applicable where there is a hierarchical relationship between the institutions with overlapping powers.465 The fact that hierarchical
supremacy does not invariably result in categorical supremacy
is likely to be surprising to many, but the fact-finding powers
exercised by Article III judges in jury trials proves the point;
though the Seventh Amendment long has been understood as
allocating fact-finding power to juries, and though the judge
cannot act as a “thirteenth juror” and substitute her judgment
for that of the jury, the judge can disregard the jury’s findings,
make credibility assessments, and engage in other fact-finding
in the process, in certain circumstances.466
which resolved conflicts among states’ overlapping adjudicatory jurisdiction in
child custody cases). A similar process of negotiation is present when bills
from the House and Senate must be reconciled insofar as neither legislative
body has the authority to trump the other’s inconsistent provisions.
465. Sometimes the hierarchical relationship is patently obvious, as in the
cases of the Supremacy Clause and the supremacy of statute to judge-made
federal common law. Other times the hierarchical relationship is less obvious.
See Rosen, supra note 445, at 1732–39 (arguing that a definitive argument has
not yet been made as to why Congress categorically trumps the President in
relation to the latter’s Commander-in-Chief powers).
466. See supra Part II.B.1; see also Rosen, supra note 445, at 1718–19 (describing the dynamic between judge and jury created by FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b)).
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The last four conflict-resolution principles are available
when there is no obvious hierarchy among the institutions with
overlapping powers. Though courts to date have not explicitly
discussed on what basis they have decided among the four, institution-specific and context-specific considerations appear to
have guided their choices. For example, institutional interests
in preserving judicial resources and ensuring the finality of
judgments have given rise to res judicata and collateral estoppel’s first-in-time principles.467 Likewise, the one exception to
res judicata’s first-in-time principle—the so-called last-in-time
rule in the case of multiple inconsistent final judgments—also
was selected by the Supreme Court for institution-specific reasons: the second inconsistent judgment came about because the
parties to the second lawsuit neglected to press their res judicata arguments, and the last-in-time rule refuses to reward such
neglect or abuse.468
Multifactor conflict-resolution principles are utilized where
institutions have equivalent hierarchical rank and a timing
rule either would not work or would exclude too many normatively relevant considerations. As the number of relevant considerations grows, however, multifactor conflict-resolution
principles risk becoming ad hoc and unpredictable.
The last conflict-resolution principle—a no-sorting principle that eschews any method for resolving conflict—holds
surprising promise. Though it could conceivably lead to chaos,
it may instead lead to formal or informal negotiations among
the institutions, particularly if they are repeat players who
have a common interest in jointly solving a problem or presenting a united front.469 Indeed, a no-sorting principle may be desirable for any number of reasons: to encourage interinstitutional competition, to spur coordination or compromise, or
when there appears to be no viable alternative conflictresolution approach.470

467. See generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326–28
(1979).
468. See Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 552 (1947); Ruth B. Ginsburg,
Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 798, 811 (1969).
469. For discussion of a similar concept in a parallel context, see Robert A.
Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature
of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 5, 23–29 (2007) (speaking of the role
of “persuasion” rather than coercion in “intersystemic governance”).
470. See id. at 18–26.
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Interestingly, Alexander Hamilton proposed a no-sorting
principle in the course of the Pacificus-Helvidius debates.471
Hamilton’s solution to the problem of possible conflicts appears
when he discusses a hypothetical that pitted the President’s
recognition power against Congress’s power to declare wars.
Hamilton asks the reader to consider a circumstance where the
United States had both a defensive and offensive treaty of alliance with France. If there were a revolution in France after
the treaty were in place, the President would have to decide
whether the “new rulers are competent organs of the National
Will and ought to (be) recognized or not” pursuant to the President’s powers to “receive ambassadors”472 even though the act
of recognition would “have laid the Legislature under an obligation . . . of exercising its power of declaring war” against the old
government under the terms of the treaty of alliance.473 From
this, Hamilton reasons that the President has the right, “in certain cases, to determine the condition of the Nation, though it
may consequentially affect the proper or improper exercise of
the Power of the Legislature to declare war.”474 Hamilton advances a no-sorting principle when he states that, notwithstanding the President’s recognition of the new government,
the President:
[C]annot control the exercise of [Congress’s] power [to declare
war] . . . The Legislature is free to perform its own duties according to
its own sense of them—though the Executive in the exercise of its
constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent state of things
which ought to weigh in the legislative decisions.475

In short, for Hamilton there is no formal mechanism for sorting
out this potential interinstitutional conflict. Though one institution’s actions (the President’s) “ought to weigh”476 in the decisions of the other, each institution ultimately is free to act according to its own best judgment.
VI. THE BIG PICTURE: METANARRATIVES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
A. METANARRATIVES
Is there a larger narrative or set of narratives that ex471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

See supra Part I.D.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; HAMILTON, supra note 104, at 14 –15.
HAMILTON, supra note 104, at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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plains the shift from exclusivity to concurrence across so many
different doctrinal contexts? Four mutually compatible possibilities suggest themselves.
First, perhaps this Article has merely documented examples of the political analogy of the natural process of entropy;
power allocated to one place does not remain there for long.
This may have some explanatory power, but clearly more than
entropy must be at work because the move from exclusivity to
concurrence has not occurred everywhere.
A second hypothesis—more powerful than the first—is that
this Article has documented instances where the “law-on-thebooks” has caught up with the “law-in-action.”477 On this view,
concurrence is not new, but just newly recognized by formal
law.
This perspective has some force. For example, though there
have been non-Article III federal courts since the early days of
the Republic, the Court long and vociferously denied that they
exercised federal judicial power.478 The Court’s ultimate acknowledgment in the latter twentieth century that Article I
courts and Article III courts have significant swaths of concurrent power was a formal recognition of what had been rather
than a judicial creation of a new system of overlapping powers.479 A corollary of the second hypothesis is that we likely
have not yet reached the end of history, meaning that the “lawon-the books” has not caught up with the “law-in-action” everywhere. For instance, a majority of the Supreme Court still insists that administrative agencies do not exercise legislative
power, though several Justices and the bulk of the scholarly
community disagree.480
A weakness of the second hypothesis is that it ignores, and
thereby threatens to obscure, the fact that in some contexts
there have been changes that have led to increasing concurrence. Consider the overlapping fact-finding power of judge and
jury. Consistent with the second hypothesis, it is true that
judges always have exercised important fact-finding powers
through such devices as evidentiary rules, burdens of proof,
477. For a brief discussion, see Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner’s
Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 255
n.194 (2009).
478. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828).
479. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986).
480. See supra Part II.D.
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and presumptions (nineteenth century averments of exclusivity
notwithstanding). Yet caselaw (such as the Munson decision)
and modern procedural innovations (like summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law) have given judges even more
fact-finding powers, significantly augmenting judges’ and juries’ overlapping powers.481
A third possible metanarrative is that the trajectory from
exclusivity to concurrence reflects an adaptation to changing
times and needs. There is great power in this narrative. Sometimes the Court has said as much,482 and many of the reasons
for concurrence documented in Part III483 boil down to this metanarrative. The only respect in which this narrative does not
fit the data is vis-à-vis those instances where concurrence has
been with us from our nation’s start—such as President Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation and Chief Justice Marshall’s
early acceptance of territorial courts.
A final metanarrative is that the move from exclusivity to
concurrence reflects a power-grab. The shift to concurrence has
systematically extended one institution’s powers at the expense
of other institutions; concurrence has made it easier for federal
institutions to act, thereby extending federal power at the expense of states and the private sector. For instance, whereas
federal statutes, which have the power to displace state law,
can be created only via the cumbersome process of bicameralism and presentment, agency rules, which also displace state
law, are generated by a far more streamlined process. As a result, the federal government displaces far more state law than
would an agency-free federal government. Likewise, more international obligations can be made in today’s world of interchangeable treaties and congressional-executive agreements
than in a treaty-only world where international obligations
were created only when a supermajority of senators concurred.
This final metanarrative does not explain all contexts
where there has been a shift from exclusivity to concurrence;
for example, it does not fit states’ exercise of extraterritorial
regulatory powers.484 Further, it is contestable as to whether
the narrative is applicable in respect of concurrence created by
delegations. For example, is Congress’s delegation of rulemak481. See supra Part II.B.1.
482. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (discussing the nondelegation doctrine).
483. See supra Part III.B.
484. See supra Part II.F.
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ing authority properly characterized as a power-grab? It all depends on what institution is said to be doing the grabbing: the
answer must be “no” from the perspective of Congress, but conceivably could be “yes” from the vantage point of federal governmental powers insofar as agencies can create more federal
law than Congress on its own could. Finally, even assuming the
power-grab narrative to be applicable to large swaths of contemporary concurrence, it is unclear what if any normative or
doctrinal significance power-grab has because it is a virtual
tautology of concurrence for two reasons. First, concurrence facilitates government action, and in this sense is amenable to
being described as a governmental power-grab; after all, concurrence frequently arises because the governmental entity
that plausibly could be said to hold an exclusive power has not
acted sufficiently. Second, because action by one governmental
institution almost always comes at the expense of some other
societal institution, concurrence’s facilitation of governmental
action necessarily constitutes a shift of decision-making authority to the institution now exercising concurrent power, and in
that sense always can be described as a power-grab.485
B. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Since reams have been written on the constitutionality of
virtually every instance of concurrence examined herein, this
Article cannot hope to definitively address any particular example. By bringing together so many examples of concurrence
from diverse doctrines, though, this Article highlights considerations that are relevant to the constitutional analysis of each
instance of concurrence.
First, although it is not the case that the constitutional fortunes of all instances of concurrence are intertwined such that
they all either stand or fall together, in analyzing any particular instance of concurrence it is relevant to recognize that concurrence is not an unusual structural feature of United States
constitutional law. Concurrence’s omnipresence should undermine the knee-jerk exclusivist opposition that frequently greets
new proposals of concurrence. For example, the argument that
courts should not devise common law solutions to asbestos or
firearms problems because such issues fall within the legislature’s powers suffers from an unexamined exclusivist assump485. For example, federal action displaces states and the private sector,
and state action displaces the private sector and (possibly) other states.
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tion that only one institution has the constitutional power to
address the problems. Concurrence’s widespread use puts a
burden on those who make such exclusivity assumptions;486 opponents of common law solutions must supply arguments as to
why concurrence is undesirable in this context.
Second, it is not the case that originalism is flatly hostile to
concurrence. Alexander Hamilton endorsed concurrence in the
Pacificus-Helvidius debates,487 and President Washington acted
consistently with Hamilton’s position when he issued the Neutrality Proclamation.488 And there are other instances of concurrence that date back to our country’s early days. For example, Congress delegated lawmaking authority to the President
beginning in the 1790s, and there have been non-Article III
federal courts in the form of territorial courts from very early
on as well.489 On the other hand, at least one instance of contemporary concurrence is patently contrary to the Founders’
understandings: the Framers thought that certain international obligations could only be created by treaty, and certainly
would have rejected the contemporary consensus that treaties
and congressional-executive agreements are interchangeable.490
In short, originalism is not invariably inconsistent with concurrence, though particular instances of concurrence may be in
tension with originalist understandings.
Third, textualism is not invariably hostile to concurrence
for two reasons. First, plausible arguments typically can be
made that two institutions have overlapping powers on account
of the different constitutional provisions that empower them; in
other words, textualism is perfectly compatible with inherencygenerated same-effect concurrence. For example, given the long
Anglo-American tradition of judicial common law powers, it
seems perfectly plausible to suggest that federal courts’ Article
III-granted judicial power creates a presumptive federal common law power that overlaps with Congress’s legislative powers.491 Second, because the Constitution almost never specifies
486. For a fascinating example of a court devising a common law solution
to the problem of mass torts, see In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580
F. Supp. 690, 699–711 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
487. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
488. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
489. See supra Part II.C–D.
490. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 808–13.
491. For such an argument, see Field, supra note 363, at 923–24. Field
notes that the Supreme Court has left open the possibility that federal courts
can adopt federal common law as broadly as Congress’s legislative authority.
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that a granted power may not be delegated, textualism is not
inconsistent with delegation-generated concurrence.492
In fact, textualism is in tension with concurrence only if it
is bundled with a very strong principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.493 But, as this Article demonstrates, constitutional law quite frequently refuses to invoke the canon of expressio unius (consider, for instance, Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion in the 1828 Canter decision upholding territorial
courts).494 And this is not patently mistaken, for textualism on
its own does not entail expressio unius. That canon is an interpretive presumption rather than an ironclad logical inference
because a text’s express articulation plausibly can mean that
the text takes a firm position only with respect to what is expressly articulated and no position with regard to unspecified
matters. The First Congress, for example, took this approach to
Article III’s grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
over “all Cases affecting Ambassadors,”495 for the 1789 Judiciary Act provided that federal district courts also had original
jurisdiction over certain cases affecting ambassadors.496 This
statutory provision was found to be constitutional by the Supreme Court in the Ames decision.497
Fourth, for those who belong to any of the “living constitutionalism” schools of constitutional interpretation, it is illuminating to observe the broad array of pragmatic considerations
that has given rise to concurrence in past. Noteworthy as well
is that the shift from exclusivity to concurrence generally occurs at the initiative of extrajudicial institutions.
At the end of the day, there are two types of concurrence
that present difficult constitutional challenges. The first is constitutional workarounds. Consider, for instance, the non-Article
III Court of Claims that was created to get around Article III’s
finality requirement.498 Is this a brilliant workaround, or an

See id. The Rules of Decision Act is appropriately understood as a statutory
limitation on federal courts’ common law powers. See Redish, supra note 362,
at 795.
492. See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text (discussing arguments
of Professors Merrill and Sunstein to this effect).
493. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009).
494. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828).
495. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
496. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
497. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 469 (1884).
498. See supra Part III.B.4.
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unconstitutional end-run around Article III’s finality requirement?
The second constitutional challenge is present when concurrence allows the federal government to act in a circumstance where, without concurrence, the federal government
would not, as a practical matter, have been able to act. The
constitutional question is whether concurrence violates the
principle of enumerated powers insofar as federal obligations
triggering the Supremacy Clause are created outside of constitutionally created mechanisms; it plausibly could be said that
such mechanisms are deliberately cumbersome so as to constrain the quantity of federal law, thereby leaving more room
for state regulation and private ordering.499 Consider in this
regard rulemaking by federal agencies, which has enabled far
more federal lawmaking than could have occurred if Congress
alone acted. Another example is congressional-executive
agreements (such as NAFTA) that create international obligations where less than two-thirds of the Senate would have
voted for a treaty. Indeed, many of the examples of concurrence
explored in this Article plausibly could be said to implicate this
enumerated powers-based concern.500
The workaround and enumerated-powers challenges both
respond to a similar phenomenon: concurrence’s facilitating governmental action in a circumstance where exclusivity would
have resulted in governmental inaction. In the end, though,
these two objections reduce to a single question: does the principle of expressio unius preclude concurrence? For example,
without regard to Article III, Congress undoubtedly could establish, under any number of its Article I, Section 8 powers,
courts of claims to adjudicate contract claims on behalf of and
against the federal government. Similarly, without regard to
the Treaty Power, NAFTA plausibly could be said to have fallen
under Congress’s power to regulate foreign commerce. The
question accordingly becomes whether Article III gives rise to
the negative inference that the only types of federal adjudicatory bodies that can be created are those that comply with Article

499. Cf. supra Part I.C.2.c (noting that prodigious federal rulemaking is
evidence of a breach of enumerated powers as it is otherwise impossible for
Congress alone to be similarly prolific if its powers were confined to Article I
procedure).
500. Perhaps the only exceptions would be the Seventh Amendment’s allocation of fact-finding authority and states’ extraterritorial regulatory powers.

2010]

FROM EXCLUSIVITY TO CONCURRENCE

1147

III’s requirements—and this is another way of stating the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
These are hard constitutional challenges. They are not sufficiently strong to sustain a transsubstantive anticoncurrence
principle, however, for two principal reasons.501
First, particularly as regards the workaround challenge,
the burden rests with those who would aim to establish a
transsubstantive exclusivity principle on account of the fact
that concurrence is a “long-continued practice, known to and
acquiesced in by” all three branches of the federal government.502 For purposes of determining whether there exists a
transsubstantive constitutional principle of exclusivity, it is relevant to look not at any single instance of concurrence, but instead at the wide range of concurrence that this Article documents. The sheer quantity of concurrence across multiple
contexts and across time defeats the proposition that there exists a transsubstantive anticoncurrence principle. The
longstanding and widespread practice of concurrence has acted
as a “gloss” on the Constitution,503 definitively establishing that
there is no transsubstantive constitutional principle of expressio unius that categorically disallows concurrence.
To be clear, this does not mean that all instances of concurrence are (or would be) constitutional.504 It does mean, however, that the constitutionality of any given instance of concurrence must be determined on the basis of context-specific
analysis, not a transsubstantive anticoncurrence principle.
501. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that concurrence is never impermissible. This Article is not the place to identify the criteria that distinguish between permissible and impermissible instances of concurrence. For an
illuminating preliminary consideration as to how to distinguish between permissible and impermissible workarounds, see Tushnet, supra note 416, at
1505–08. For purposes of this Article it suffices to establish that concurrence
is not per se impermissible.
502. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)). One conceivably might
ask why acquiescence by the federal government can justify a practice that
comes at the expense of state governments (as when concurrence facilitates
actions by the federal government that have the power of displacing state
law). The best, though perhaps not entirely adequate, answer is that the federal government is structured to take account of states’ interests. See Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552–59 (1985) (discussing the
political safeguards of federalism). The extent to which this suffices certainly
merits additional consideration.
503. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,
610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
504. See supra note 501.
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Second, the force of the two hard constitutional challenges
is largely blunted by the hoary case of M’Culloch v. Maryland.505 In upholding Congress’s power to charter a national
bank under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court rejected a strong principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius
in favor of a “useful” interpretation that gave Congress the
power to adopt “any means which tended directly to the execution of the constitutional powers of the government.”506 In the
course of its opinion, the M’Culloch Court asked, “whence arises the power to punish in cases not prescribed by the constitution” due to the fact that the power to punish “is expressly given [by the Constitution] in some cases.”507 Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius is what fuels this interpretive question, and
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court rejected the canon, reasoning that Congress’s powers to establish post offices
included the power to “punish those who steal letters from the
post office, or rob the mail” despite the Constitution’s silence
vis-à-vis such punishments.508 In so doing, the M’Culloch opinion could be accused of treating as “mere surplusage”509 the
constitutional text specifying Congress’s powers to punish
counterfeiters insofar as that power could have been inferred
from Congress’s power to “coin Money.”510 M’Culloch’s holding
likewise put pressure on the concept of enumerated powers.
What led to a “useful” outcome and workable government overrode these considerations.
The pragmatic considerations relied on by the Court in
M’Culloch are directly relevant to concurrence. The Court rejected a narrow construction grounded in expressio unius est exclusio alterius because the Constitution was “intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs.”511 M’Culloch refused to interpret the Constitution as having “prescribed the means by which
government should, in all future time, execute its powers” and
505. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
506. Id. at 419.
507. Id. at 416. Because the Constitution gives Congress the power “to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the
United States,” M’Culloch recognized that it could be concluded that “no punishment should be inflicted in cases where the right to punish is not expressly given.” Id. at 416–17.
508. Id. at 417.
509. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
510. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 5.
511. See M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415.
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instead selected the construction that granted “the legislature . . . the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its
reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.”512
In this regard, the widespread and longstanding examples of
concurrence explored in this Article reflect experience’s lesson
that concurrence is, at the very least, “convenient, or useful”513
for the execution of governmental powers. Indeed—even more
than this—concurrence may be a necessary mechanism for ensuring that government functions well in some contexts.
To conclude, nothing in the Constitution expressly bars
concurrence. Concurrence is no more inconsistent with expressio unius est exclusio alterius and the concept of enumerated
powers than was M’Culloch’s construction of the Necessary and
Proper Clause. If anything, concurrence implicates enumerated
powers to a lesser degree than M’Culloch, for when a secondary
federal actor (for example, an administrative agency) undertakes actions that unquestionably fall within the power of a
primary federal actor (such as Congress) there can be no concern that the federal action has displaced authority that the
Constitution intended to leave to states or to the private sector.
Concurrence may be improper in particular contexts,514 but it
cannot be declared unconstitutional across the board.
CONCLUSION
Concurrence—the circumstance where multiple institutions have the power to undertake act X despite the fact that
constitutional text plausibly could be said to have allocated
that power to a single institution—is a common, yet frequently
overlooked, feature of American constitutional law. Concurrence has been present from our nation’s earliest days. For example, President Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation reflected an understanding that both he and Congress had power
to interpret a treaty that could have obligated the United
States to go to war. And, too, the First Congress enacted several statutes that gave the President rulemaking authority. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court almost always has initially resisted claims of concurrence, insisting instead on exclusivist
interpretations of the Constitution’s power-grants. For this reason, concurrence typically has been initiated by nonjudicial in512. Id. at 415–16.
513. Cf. id. at 413 (defining what constitutes “necessary” in the Necessary
and Proper Clause).
514. See supra note 501.
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stitutions, and has been judicially acknowledged only after becoming deeply entrenched.
Concurrence carries an array of pragmatic benefits. Concurrence frequently is turned to when the most obviously
tasked institution has failed to act. Concurrence oftentimes is a
mechanism for engaging competencies enjoyed by a second institution that are not present in the primarily tasked institution, holding out the promise of superior governmental decision
making and action taking. Concurrence has been justified on
the ground that it was necessary to address problems unforeseen by the Founders, to deal with emergencies, and to augment efficiency.
The risk of generating conflicts is perhaps the main anxiety occasioned by concurrence, but there are multiple tools
present in United States law that address conflicts among institutions with overlapping powers. Accordingly, the risk of conflicts constitutes a cost of concurrence to be weighed against its
potential benefits, but is not a reason for flatly rejecting concurrence.
Although widespread, concurrence is not found everywhere; many of the Constitution’s provisions always have been
understood to allocate power exclusively, not concurrently.
There is no general, transsubstantive principle that explains
when constitutional power will be deemed to be exclusively or
concurrently granted. No transsubstantive principle requires
concurrence, nor do any transsubstantive principles (such as
expressio unius est exclusio alterius or enumerated powers)
render it a priori unconstitutional. Instead, the choice between
exclusivity and concurrence has been made on a context-bycontext basis. There are good reasons to think this contextspecific analysis to be desirable, though the choice in any given
context can be aided by considering concurrence’s costs and
benefits in other contexts.

